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Completing activities online are a part of everyday life, both professionally and
personally. But, conducting daily operations, interacting, and sharing information on the
Internet does not come without its risks as well as a potential for harm. Substantial
financial and information losses for individuals, organizations, and governments are
reported regularly due to vulnerabilities as well as breaches caused by insiders. Although
advances in Information Technology (IT) have been significant over the past several
decades when it comes to protection of corporate information systems (IS), human errors
and social engineering appear to prevail in circumventing such IT protections. While
most employees may have the best of intentions, without cybersecurity skills they
represent the weakest link in an organization’s IS security. Skills are defined as the
combination of knowledge, experience, and ability to do something well. Cybersecurity
skills correspond to the skills surrounding the hardware and software required to execute
IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks.
The main goal of this research study was to develop a scenarios-based, hands-on measure
of non-IT professionals’ cybersecurity skills. As opposed to IT professionals, end-users
are one of the weakest links in the cybersecurity chain, due to their limited cybersecurity
skills. Historically, non-IT professionals (i.e., office assistants, managers, executives)
have access to sensitive data and represent 72% to 95% of cybersecurity threats to
organizations. This study addressed the problem of threats to organizational IS due to
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees. Current measures of cybersecurity
skills of non-IT professionals are based on self-reported surveys and were found
inaccurate. Prior IS and medical research found participants view scenarios as
nonintrusive and unintimidating. Therefore, this research study utilized scenarios with
observable hands-on tasks to measure and quantify cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals.
This study included developmental research with a sequential-exploratory approach to
combine qualitative and quantitative data collection. To ensure validity and reliability of
the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI), a panel of 18 subject matter experts (SMEs)
reviewed the CSI following the Delphi expert methodology. The SMEs’ responses were
incorporated into the development of an iPad application (app) prototype
(MyCyberSkills™). Following the iPad app prototype development, eight SMEs
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provided feedback on the scenarios, tasks, and scoring of the app using the Delphi
technique. Furthermore, pilot testing of the app was conducted by manually collecting
and scoring the hands-on task performance of a group of 21 non-IT professionals. The
manually collected data were compared to the app computed results to ensure reliability
and validity. All revisions were incorporated into the prototype prior to the start of the
empirical research phase.
Once the iPad app prototype was completed and fully tested, the quantitative research
phase used the prototype to collect data and document the results of the measure.
Participants from multiple public organizations were asked to complete the scenariosbased, hands-on tasks as presented in the prototype. Following the pre-analysis data
screening, this study used a combination of descriptive statistics and one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) to address the research questions. Results from 188 participants
indicate that educational level and experience using technology appear to be significant
demographic variables when it comes to the level of cybersecurity skills demonstrated by
non-IT professionals. Moreover, job function, hours accessing the Internet, or primary
online activity did not appear to be significant variables when it comes to the level of
cybersecurity skills of this population.
This research validated that the CSI benchmarking index could be used to assess an
individual’s cybersecurity skills level. As organizations continue to rely on the Internet
for conducting their daily operations, understanding an employee’s cybersecurity skills
level is critical to securing an organization’s IS. Moreover, the CSI operationalized into
the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype can be used to assess an organization’s
employee’s demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks. Furthermore, assessing the
cybersecurity skills levels of employees could provide an organization insight into what
is needed to further mitigate threats due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by
employees. Discussions and implications for future research are provided.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background
The threats to organizational information systems (IS) due to vulnerabilities and
breaches caused by employees continue to cause not only financial losses, but also
information losses (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen, Bailey, & Baar, 2014; Peha, 2013). The
protection of IS lie in the most vulnerable spot; that vulnerability usually rests in
individuals (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Organizations and individuals rely on the
embedded security features of the information technology (IT) products and services
(Peha, 2013). Even with sophisticated intrusion detection systems, organizations are still
at risk because employees make mistakes due to the convincing nature of social
engineering incidents (i.e., phishing attacks, drive-by downloads, etc.). An employee,
even with the best intentions, may work in an insecure manner or under stress and cause a
threat (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2013). This study addressed the need for
additional empirical investigation and measures of cybersecurity skills, especially of nonIT professionals (Choi, 2013; Choi, Levy, & Hovav, 2013; Thomson & von Solms, 2005;
Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). The results of this study contribute to the IS body of knowledge
by providing researchers and practitioners insight into the cybersecurity skills level of
non-IT professionals. Participants asked to respond to a survey were found unwilling to
report their actual behaviors related to cybersecurity issues in the workplace (Hu, Xu,

2

Dinev, & Ling, 2011). However, D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) found scenarios
were a nonintrusive and unintimidating method to participants when attempting to collect
computer misuse data. Moreover, participants preferred hands-on tasks when in an IS
learning environment (Li & Liu, 2011). Thus, this study utilized scenarios with
observable hands-on tasks to measure cybersecurity skills. Additionally, the results of
this study promise to influence industry practices in mitigating the vulnerabilities and
threats associated with cyber-attacks.
The remainder of this draft is organized in the following manner. First, a
statement of the specific problem researched is presented. Next, the main dissertation
goal and research questions as well as the relevance and significance of the research are
discussed. A brief review of literature of related areas of research is presented within
each of the relevant areas: malware, personally identifiable information (PII), and work
information systems (WIS). Specific barriers and limitations are discussed. Finally, the
approach section outlines the specific data analyses used to formulate a users’ CSI, as
well as a definition of terms.

Problem Statement
The problem that this research addressed is the threats to organizational IS due to
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen et al.,
2014; Peha, 2013). According to Axelrod (2006), cybersecurity is “the prevention of
damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and if needed, the restoration of
electronic information and communications systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity,
and availability” (p. 1). Skill is defined as “a combination of ability, knowledge, and
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experience that enables a person to do something well” (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991, p. 280).
Therefore, cybersecurity skills (i.e., preventing malware, PII theft, WIS breaches)
correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and experience surrounding
the hardware and software required to execute IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks (Choi
et al., 2015). Improvements of IT tools (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, security pop-up
messages, etc.) do not appear to solve the cybersecurity problem of a user without
cybersecurity skills becoming prey to the deceptive nature of social engineering
techniques (Algarni, Xu, Chan, & Tian, 2014). The protection of information lies in the
most vulnerable spot and that vulnerability usually rests in individuals (Mitnick & Simon,
2002). It appears that a non-IT professional with limited cybersecurity skills presents
opportunities for organizational information vulnerabilities and threats.
The importance of cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals has not minimized
over the years. Phish Tank (2009) and the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) (2010)
identified threats to frequently targeted markets (auction, financial, payment services, &
retail). Five years later, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), classifieds, gaming,
government, and social media were added to the list of targeted markets (APWG, 2014).
Many approaches from artificial intelligence to security education, training, and
awareness (SETA) programs attempt to mitigate the challenge of cyber threats. Phishing
detection methods (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, heuristics, domain name server (DNS)
analyzers, Classifier System, Lookup System, & hybrids) are usually invisible to the user;
the detection occurs prior to the phished communication actually reaching the user
(Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). User interfaces have seen updates to include security pop-up
messages (Hong, 2012), inhibitive attractors (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013), and domain-
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highlighting (Lin, Greenberg, Trotter, Ma, & Aycock, 2011). Organizations and
individuals rely on the embedded security features of the IT products and services sold on
the Internet (Peha, 2013). Even with embedded IT security tools working well, the non-IT
user may still receive a social engineering message that can hook them into making
mistakes due to low cybersecurity skills (Winkler & Dealy, 1995).
In December 2013, Target Corporation announced its point-of-sale (POS) system
experienced a data breach that began with a malware attack on a contractor (Yadron,
Ziobro, & Devlin, 2014; Ziobro, 2014). Similarly, compromised login credentials of
some employees were used by hackers to gain access to eBay’s entire user database
(Bensinger & Calia, 2014). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2012)
recognized the great escalation of the nation’s cyber threat in recent years.
Recommendations were made to develop and advance technical cybersecurity skills as a
way to encourage qualified candidates (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012).
Those users armed with the skills needed to quickly identify and report possible cyberespionage occurrences “discovered more breaches than any other internal process or
technology” (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2014, p. 42). “Yet we ignore the human
factor in corporate security at our peril, since it’s all too clear that technology alone can’t
guarantee security” (Kaspersky Lab, 2013, p. 15). Thus, it appears that additional
empirical investigation on cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals is warranted
(Choi, 2013; Thomson & von Solms, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003).

Dissertation Goal
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and empirically test a
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set of hands-on tasks set to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals.
The need for this work was demonstrated by the work of Choi (2013), Furnell (2007),
Whitman (2004), Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as Rubin and Dierdorff (2009).
Furnell (2007) found that individuals were not attuned to observe the visual, technical,
and language cues involved with phishing e-mails. Whitman (2004) noted that human
error or failures were the highest threat to information security. Furthermore, a user’s
habituated disregard of a security warning for a Website increases risk to IS security
(Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, & Eargle, 2014). Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as
Rubin and Dierdorff (2009) focused on the need to include competencies, skills,
knowledge, and abilities in the classroom so students had the tools (experience) necessary
for future employment. The maturing of an individual’s knowledge and skills develops
user competency (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). Choi (2013) recognized the lack of
research involving cybersecurity skills, and the need for a better measure to assess
cybersecurity skills. Furthermore, Choi (2013) identified self-reported surveys as a
limitation of research due to a participant’s reluctance to report actual misuse behavior or
their inability to properly judge their accurate cybersecurity skill levels. Whereas,
Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) cautioned self-reported perceived skills do not always
correspond to the individual’s actual skills. In the work of Gravill, Compeau, and
Marcolin (2006), the use of paper versus computer self-reported evaluative measures
varied more in accuracy than self-reported factual information, i.e., years of experience.
Xu and Yeh (2012) adjusted for the varying individualities of the assessors that may
create biases in the self-assessment process. Thus, this study was aligned to develop a set
of scenarios that were used to assess the hands-on cybersecurity skills of non-IT
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professionals based on demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks.
This work built on prior research by first identifying the difference between skills
and competence. Burley, Eisenberg, and Goodman (2014) stated that cybersecurity was
not a solitary occupational category and identified that knowledge, skills, and abilities
were needed for more than cybersecurity work. According to Toth and Klein (2014),
knowledge gathered by users and honed skills in a certain functional area developed
competencies. Both Burley et al. (2014), as well as Toth and Klein (2014) appeared to
exclude the very important factor of ‘experience’ or assumed it under another defined
category. Toth and Klein (2014) excluded an additional factor, ‘ability’ altogether.
According to Boyatzis and Kolb (1991), as well as Levy (2005), skill is a combination of
knowledge, experience, and abilities that enables users to perform well. Over time, skills
are honed and competencies are acquired (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). A user’s
computer competence is vital for an organization that relies on its employees to possess
skills (i.e., combination of knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to complete technical
tasks (Downey & Smith, 2011). More than any other internal process or technology,
breaches were discovered by users armed with the skills needed to quickly identify and
report possible cyber-espionage occurrences (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2014). Of the
16,000 responding to a phishing quiz, McAfee Labs (2014) found 80% had fallen for one
out of seven phishing e-mails. Those in accounting, finance, and human resources,
“which arguably hold some of the most sensitive corporate data, performed the worst”
(McAfee Labs, 2014, p. 4). According to PwC (2013), most security incidents were
attributed to everyday insiders like current or former employees. Verizon
Communication’s chief security officer stated “it’s important to note that insider threats
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are not necessarily a ‘bad guy’ with bad intentions; it could be a good employee doing
righteous work in an insecure manner” (PwC, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, due to the lack of
technological backgrounds and skills, non-IT professionals (including managers) reported
finding themselves ‘left behind’ the IT staff (Guzman, Stam, & Stanton, 2008).
Furthermore, even with the best intentions, mistakes of non-IT users (i.e., office
assistants, managers, executives), due to poor cybersecurity skills, represent the weakest
link in an organization’s IS security. Thus, this leads to the importance of a measure to
assess the level of cybersecurity skills held by a non-IT professional.
This work secondly built on prior research by developing a measure that assessed
the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Bronsburg (2011), as well as Morcke,
Dornan, and Eika (2013) mentioned the importance of demonstrating the high-level of
skills experienced in the medical and health profession academic programs. Hands-on
skill assessment is a substantial part of the medical academic community (Berendonk,
Stalmeijer, & Schuwirth, 2013). The importance of skills and hands-on skills assessment
found in the health industry appears applicable to cybersecurity skills as well. Torkzadeh
and Lee (2003) used self-reported surveys to research the individual’s perception of his
or her IT skills and cautioned that perceived skills do not always correspond to actual
observable skills. In the work of Gravill et al. (2006), users inaccurately assessed their
knowledge of a specific software package. Prior literature such as Moskal (2010), Weigel
and Hazen (2014), as well as Xu and Yeh (2012), addressed the flaws and consequences
of erroneous self-assessment reporting. Thus, this research study established and
validated a set of hands-on tasks that measured observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment.
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The validity of observable hands-on tasks builds on the prior research of Katz
(1974), Williamson (1975), Swanson (2004), as well as Vassiliou et al. (2014). Hands-on
skills were developed by employee experimentation (trial & error) over time (Katz, 1974;
Williamson, 1975). Swanson (2004) argued hands-on tasks were crucial for an
employee’s learning outcomes. Observable hands-on skills testing provided the unbiased
evidence of competence required to perform a surgical endoscopy without the high-stakes
risk to a patient (Vassiliou et al., 2014). Thus, this study established a measure that
provides unbiased observable cybersecurity skills assessment without the high-stakes risk
to IT by using expert-validated set of cybersecurity skills and scenario driven tasks.
The five specific goals of this research study were as follows. The first specific
goal of this study identified a set of cybersecurity skills pinpointed by subject matter
experts (SMEs) as those that can help mitigate critical vulnerabilities, which usually
involve the compromise of devices, computers, and/or networks by non-IT professionals
within their organizations. The second specific goal of this study developed a set of tasks
that were categorized and linked to the SMEs identified set of cybersecurity skills. The
third specific goal of this study developed a benchmarking index to hierarchically
aggregate the set of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks.
Such aggregated measure is called the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI) and integrated
the set of measurable cybersecurity skills into a single benchmarking index ranging from
zero to 100. According to Fenrich (2005), “hands-on skills can transfer to the real world”
(p. 353). Chisholm et al. (2013) utilized a hands-on skills test to assess a group of
emergency physicians’ ability to work with medical technology equipment. Therefore,
the fourth specific goal of this study empirically tested the CSI, which is based on real-
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life scenarios, for cybersecurity skills on a group of 188 non-IT professionals. Prior IS
research, e.g., Algarni, Xu, and Chan (2015), as well as Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru,
Cranor, and Downs (2010), found a correlation between demographic factors and victims
of cybersecurity threats. Therefore, the last specific goal of this study empirically
assessed the contribution of age, education level, gender, job function (e.g.,
administrative staff, managerial, executive, operations, physical security, information
technology, technical services, & other), primary online activity, number of hours
accessing the Internet, and experience using technology to the CSI.

Research Questions
The main research question that this study addressed is: What tasks enable the
validation of a hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals? In addition, this study addressed five specific research questions as
follows.
RQ1: What are the specific subject matter experts (SMEs) identified set of
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals, which address the most
common organizational cybersecurity threats?
RQ2: What are the specific SMEs identified tasks that can be categorized, linked,
and validated to the set of the identified cybersecurity skills?
RQ3: What are the specific SMEs identified weights of the tasks and skills that
enable a validated hierarchical aggregation to the Cybersecurity Skills
Index (CSI) benchmarking index?
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RQ4: What are the scores of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188 non-IT
professionals?
RQ5: Are there any significant differences to CSI based on age, gender,
educational level, job function, primary online activity, number of hours
accessing the Internet, or experience using technology?

Relevance and Significance
Relevance
The purpose of this study was to seek mitigation of the threats to organizational IS
due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by non-IT professionals. Adversaries focus on
gaining access to IS through employees (Kaspersky Lab, 2013). In a benchmark study,
Ponemon Institute (2014a) found that human error or malicious attacks (i.e., criminal
insiders, malware infections, or phishing/social engineering) were the root cause for 72%
of organizational data breaches. There has been a variety of research studies focused on
cybersecurity issues relating to embedded security features (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013;
Hong, 2012; Lin et al., 2011). However, a review of literature reveals that few studies
have focused on cybersecurity as it relates to non-IT professionals (Choi et al., 2013;
Jensen et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). Cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities are causing
substantial financial losses for individuals, organizations, and governments all over the
world (Levy, Ramim, Furnell, & Clarke, 2011; Ramim & Levy, 2006). Cyberwar is
another major concern that nations around the world are struggling to get ready to fight or
maintain strong defense tactics. According to PwC (2013), an employee with the best
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intentions working in an insecure manner may cause a threat. As organizations continue
to rely on the Internet for conducting their daily operations, understanding an employee’s
cybersecurity skills levels is critical to securing information and the systems that stores it.
Given the documented increase in importance of cybersecurity in everyday activity, the
relevance of this study is substantial.
Significance
This research advanced current research in cybersecurity and facilitated an
increase in the body of knowledge regarding non-IT professionals as it relates to their
cybersecurity skills in the context of malware, PII, and WIS. Prior research noted paper
(Gravill et al., 2006) and self-reported (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003) surveys did not
accurately assess actual skills. According to Downey and Smith (2011), a user’s
computer competence is vital for an organization that relies on its employees to possess
skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to complete technical tasks. The
investigation of a good problem statement has practical significance (Terrell, 2012).
Insight into an employee’s cybersecurity skills levels can potentially help reduce the
opportunities for organizational information vulnerabilities and threats. As seen in
literature, organizations have an ongoing need for non-IT cybersecurity skilled
professionals. Therefore, this study focused mainly on the non-IT professionals
representing corporate organizations. Moreover, given the documented increase in
individual, organizational, and governmental cybersecurity incidents, the significance of
this study is substantial.

Barriers and Issues
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One potential barrier for this study was obtaining permission to measure the
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
was needed in order to use non-IT professionals as participants. Approval to conduct the
study was obtained prior to pursuing IRB approval.
Using the Delphi technique was a potential barrier. According to Gordon (1994),
participant selection, following the Delphi technique, requires a great deal of attention
and the researcher must meticulously prepare and test questionnaires to avoid ambiguity.
Collecting an adequate number of responses from SMEs throughout the Delphi technique
proved challenging as well (Gordon, 1994). In addition, identifying and locating the
SMEs added to the challenge of the Delphi technique. Scheele (1975) recommended
providing gifts or ‘in kind’ rewards as a way to encourage participation.
Appropriately implementing the development research within the accepted
parameters is a potential barrier. The elements of development research focuses
on complex, innovative solutions that have few, if any, accepted design and
development principles; a comprehensive grounding in the literature and theory;
empirical testing of product’s practicality and effectiveness, as well as thorough
documentation, analysis, and reflection on processes and outcomes (Ellis & Levy,
2009, p. 328).
With a foundation in literature (i.e., Ellis & Levy, 2010; Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010), this
study progressed towards a successful research level design and development effort that
incorporated the Delphi technique expert panel.
While developing and validating such a comprehensive set of scenarios-based,
hands-on benchmarking index is valuable for organizations, the process of implementing
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it in order to actually measure such skills was challenging. In order to overcome this
issue, this study developed an iPad application (app) prototype that operationalized the
previously developed and validated scenarios-based, hands-on tasks CSI into an actual
app that was used to collect the cybersecurity skills data.

Limitations and Delimitations
Limitations
A limitation of this study was related to the expert opinions collected during the
Delphi technique. Expert opinions are limited to those members recruited (Ellis & Levy,
2010). Therefore, combining the Delphi technique, review of literature, and a pilot-test
mitigated this limitation. Furthermore, the recruitment of experts was not limited to one
industry or government type. Thus, mitigating the limitation of bias.
Additionally, measuring the participant’s responses to the scenarios-based, handson cybersecurity tasks was a limitation. Validity and reliability would be threatened if the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app incorrectly recorded or scored the participants’ responses. In
order to mitigate this limitation, an iterative development process was followed (Sheng,
Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, & Cranor, 2007). Furthermore, an ongoing review of
the data recorded and respective scoring was tested throughout the development process.
A comprehensive review was conducted during the pilot-test to ensure the participants’
responses were correctly recorded and scored prior to conducting the empirical study.
Moreover, internal validity would be threatened if participants chose not to respond
truthfully to the cybersecurity tasks presented during the data collection process (Ellis &
Levy, 2010). Therefore, the vulnerability for respondents to desire to provide consistent
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or socially-acceptable answers was mitigated by presenting four scenario-based, hands-on
tasks to measure each respective cybersecurity skills (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003).
Furthermore, a participant completed each of the observable hands-on, scenario-based
cybersecurity tasks while in the presence of an IS security expert. Each participant that
completed all of the cybersecurity tasks were offered an honorarium (Scheele, 1975).
Delimitations
A delimitation of this study was its limitation to a single mobile technology
platform, an iPad app. Furthermore, this study was limited to the Southeastern United
States. Participants’ responsiveness to the iPad app was seen as a possible delimitation of
the study as it may not be the same presented on a different platform and/or at other
institutions.

Definitions of Terms
The following represent terms and definitions.
Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI) – The cybersecurity skills index is a logical and
repeatable quantitative measure that indicate the level of cybersecurity skills of an
individual.
Cyber-attack – illegal activities or a crime that takes place on an information system,
i.e., theft of software, data, unauthorized access, or modification of information (Libicki,
Senty, & Pollak, 2014; Ramim & Levy, 2006).
Cybersecurity – “the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and
if needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1).
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Cybersecurity risk – describes any disruption of daily operation and monetary loss
caused by a malicious cyber event (Mukhopadhyay, Chatterjee, Saha, Mahanti, &
Sadhukhan, 2013; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2014).
Cybersecurity skill – correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and
experience surrounding the hardware and software required to execute IS security to
mitigate cyber-attacks (Choi et al., 2013).
Information System (IS) – “A discrete set of information resources [i.e., personnel,
equipment, funds, and information technology] organized for the collection, processing,
maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information. Also includes
specialized systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and
private branch exchange (PBX) systems, and environmental control systems” (Kissel,
2013, p. 101).
Information Technology (IT) – “Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem
of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or
reception of data or information” (Kissel, 2013, p. 104).
Instrument – “Any means used to measure or otherwise study subjects. In the language
of social and behavioral research, an instrument can call to mind a mechanical device (as
it does in ordinary language – a dentist’s drill, a saxophone), but it is used more broadly
to include written instruments, such as attitude scales or interview schedules” (Vogt &
Johnson, 2011, p. 181). “Therefore, indices, scales, and questionnaires are all
measurement instruments” (Mendoza, 2014, p. 4).
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Personally identifiable information (PII) – Any information about an individual that
may be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, i.e., name, social security
number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, or biometric records, either alone
or when combined with other public information that is linkable to a specific individual,
i.e., medical, educational, financial, and employment information (Krishnamurthy &
Wills, 2009; McCallister, Grance, & Scarfone, 2010).
Phishing – A cyber-attack that mimics a legitimate or trusted Website to lure victims to
disclose their user ids, passwords, or other personal information; it is being used in
conjunction with social engineering attacks (McDowell, 2006; Ramim & Levy, 2006).
Risk – “a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential
circumstance or event, and typically a function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise
if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2006, p.
8).
Risk mitigation – “prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate riskreducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process”
(Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), 2010, p. 62).
Skill – “a combination of ability, knowledge, and experience that enables a person to do
something well” (Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991, p. 280).
Social engineering – the process of deceiving or influencing individuals to provide
personal or corporate information in order to compromise the victim’s information
system (computer) for the purpose of benefiting the attacker (Algarni et al., 2014;
Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Winkler & Dealy, 1995)
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Vulnerability – “A weakness in a system that can be exploited to violate the system’s
intended behavior relative to safety, security, reliability, availability, and integrity or to
obtain access to some asset” (Andrews & Whittaker, 2004, p. 70).
Work Information System (WIS) – An information system operating in an
organization.

Summary
This study addressed the threats to organizational IS due to vulnerabilities and
breaches caused by employees by designing, developing, and empirically testing a
hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals (Hovav
& Gray, 2014; Jensen et al., 2014, Peha, 2013). Non-IT professionals (i.e., office
assistants, managers, executives) historically have access to sensitive data and represent
72% to 95% of cybersecurity threats to organizations. However, current measures of
cybersecurity skills are based on perceived skills and self-reported surveys that do not
always correspond to actual observable skills (Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003; Xu & Yeh, 2012).
As seen in the medical and healthcare academic curriculum, assessing observable highlevel hands-on skills allow for experience without harm to a system or individual
(Chisholm et al., 2013; Fenrich, 2005). Thus, the importance of skills and hands-on
assessment appears applicable to cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Therefore,
by using expert-validated set of cybersecurity skills and scenario driven tasks, this study
established and validated a set of hands-on tasks that measures observable cybersecurity
skills of non-IT professionals without bias or the high-stakes risk to IT.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Introduction
In this chapter, a literature review is presented to provide a synopsis of the
relevant literature pertaining to skills, data breaches, and cybersecurity as well as to lay
the theoretical foundation for this study. The literature review was an important first step
and “the theoretical foundation for the empirical study” (Paré, Trudel, Jaana, & Kitsiou,
2015, p. 183). Furthermore, a systematic search of quality peer-reviewed and secondary
IS literature substantiates the existence of the research problem, vindicates a new
contribution to the existing body of knowledge, and structures the study (Levy & Ellis,
2006; Paré et al., 2015). To ensure breadth, depth, rigor, consistency, clarity, brevity, as
well as an effective analysis and synthesis, an extensive search of the IS literature domain
was conducted using interdisciplinary fields including aviation, IS, medical, and
transportation (Hart, 1998). From this literature review, existing knowledge, research
questions, approach, and theoretical foundation for this study of designing, developing,
and empirically testing a scenarios-based, hands-on hierarchical cybersecurity skills
index were discovered. Moreover, information regarding cybersecurity skills shortage,
risk mitigation, and tools are presented. Furthermore, in order to operationalize the CSI
into an actual app, the scenarios and hands-on tasks were designed and developed
utilizing literature from this review.
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Skills and Competencies
Skills Defined
According to Boyatzis and Kolb (1991) as well as Levy (2005), skill is a
combination of knowledge, experience, and abilities that enables users to perform well.
The acquisition of a skill is a learning process and generally adopts three incremental
stages (Anderson, 1982; Gravill et al., 2006). These stages begin with the initial
acquisition of a skill known as declarative knowledge (Stage 1). At this stage, instruction
and information about a skill are given to the user (Anderson, 1982; Fitts, 1964).
Moreover, Stage 1 allows the user to establish the knowledge needed as a foundation for
later learning stages (Gravill et al., 2006). The second stage of skill acquisition (Stage 2)
allows the learner to practice declarative knowledge and convert it to procedural
knowledge (Fitts, 1964; Neves & Anderson, 1981). Knowledge becomes better organized
and users start to connect the actions needed to complete an activity (Gravill et al., 2006).
Next, at the third stage, comes automaticity (Fitts, 1964; Marcolin, Compeau, Munro, &
Huff, 2000). Users progress beyond the initial acquisition stage into an efficient and
autonomous (Stage 3) by increasing their experience level (Anderson, 1982; Gravill et
al., 2006; Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993). Experience positively influences a user’s
computer usage, which helps establish the needed experience of the skill (Gravill et al.,
2006). The ability to generalize procedures and increase performance occurs during the
acquisition of knowledge phases (Marcolin et al., 2000). Over time, Eschenbrenner and
Nah (2014) identified that skills are honed and competencies are acquired. The skill
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development stages are shown in Figure 1. Whereas, Table 1 lists a summary of research
studies defining skills and the skill development stages.

Figure 1. Skill development stages over time

Table 1
Summary of Skills Defined
Study

Methodology Sample

Anderson,
1982

Theoretical

Boyatzis &
Kolb, 1991

Development
and empirical
study via
video/audio
taped
sessions

236 adults
consisting of
students,
managers, and
an assortment
of
manufacturing
professionals

Instrument
or Construct
Acquisition of
cognitive skill

Main Finding or
Contribution
Skill acquisition is
a learning process
that has three
stages (e.g.,
declarative,
procedural, &
automaticity); each
require time for
honing

Personal and
organizational
skills based
on the theory
of learning

Developed and
validated the
learning skills
profile, which
assesses learning
skills through a
typology of 12
skill scales
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Table 1
Summary of Skills Defined (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Eschenbrenner Literature
& Nah, 2014
review and
synthesis

Fitts, 1964

Theoretical

Gravill et
al., 2006

Empirical
study via
paper survey
and controlled
experiment

Kraiger et
al., 1993

Theoretical

Levy, 2005

Empirical
study via
longitudinal
study

67 volunteers
from four large
financial,
retail,
consulting, and
distribution
organizations

2 MBA
programs (one
online and one
on-campus)

Instrument
or Construct
IS user
competency,
social
cognitive
theory

Main Finding or
Contribution
Developed a
conceptual
foundation of IS
user competency
and proposed an IS
user competency
framework

Perceptualmotor skill
learning

Skill learning is a
continuously
evolving
hierarchical process
that with practice
over time leads to
peak performance
(i.e., competency)

Self-assessed
user
competence

End-users did
accurately selfassess their software
knowledge, but did
improve as
experience and
understanding of IT
increased

Cognitive,
skills-based,
and affective
outcomes
theories

Identified
framework for
evaluating learning
outcomes using an
organized
classification
scheme

Learning
skills profile

Skills were
positively enhanced
in both the online
and on-campus
MBA programs
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Table 1
Summary of Skills Defined (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Marcolin et
al., 2000

Empirical
study via
survey and
flash-card
self-efficacy
assessment

66 university
administrators
and students

Instrument
Main Finding or
or Construct Contribution
End-user
End-users ranked
competency
higher their
perceived ability to
use a software
package than their
demonstrated
competence level of
the same software
package

Competence vs. Skills
Bronsburg (2011) as well as Morcke et al. (2013), demonstrated the importance of
the high-level of skills experienced in the medical and health profession academic
programs. The need to include competencies, skills, knowledge, and abilities in the
classroom so students have the tools (experience) necessary for future employment were
the focus of the research by Havelka and Merhout (2009), as well as Rubin and Dierdorff
(2009). Havelka and Merhout (2009) found that knowledge is obtained through
coursework. Whereas, Rubin and Dierdorff (2009) found the courses offered by colleges
and universities are relevant to the competency level of a student. It was discovered that
the maturing of an individual’s knowledge improves skills, which then develops user
competency (Eschenbrenner & Nah, 2014). Moreover, it was previously noted in
literature that knowledge gathered by users and honed skills in a certain functional area
developed competencies (Toth & Klein, 2014). A misalignment between course offerings
and required corporate competencies reduces the individual’s exposure to important
knowledge that is needed to do a task well (Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009). Additionally, it
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was noted that a reasonable degree of competency at a skill “requires at least 100 hours of
learning and practice” (Anderson, 1982, p. 369). An individual’s competency level of a
particular skill is valuable; it may influence or even determine an individual’s level of
professional success and satisfaction (Havelka & Merhout, 2009; Levy & Ramim, 2015).
Moreover, IT feature use was found to positively influence an increase in an end-user’s
skills (Benilian, 2015). A user’s computer competence is vital for an organization that
relies on its employees to possess skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, & abilities) to
complete technical tasks (Downey & Smith, 2011). Thus, it appears competency is
acquired after a skill is practiced over time (Levy & Ramim, 2015). A summary of
research studies regarding skill, competence, and the development of competence are
listed in Table 2.
Table 2
Summary of Competence vs. Skills
Study

Methodology

Sample

Bronsburg,
2011

Empirical
study via
survey

102 medical
students at a
private nonprofit
university in
the
Southeastern
U.S.

Downey &
Smith, 2011

Empirical
study via
survey

610
midshipmen
in the U.S.
Navy’s
commissioning program

Instrument
or Construct
Learning
skills profile
to measure IT
skill
competency

Main Finding or
Contribution
To better prepare a
medical student for
the workforce,
opportunities to
learn IT skills are
needed

Competence
and it
relationship
with attitudes

Competence and
attitudes were
improved with
skills training
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Table 2
Summary of Competence vs. Skills (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Eschenbrenner Literature
& Nah, 2014
review and
synthesis

Havelka &
Theoretical
Merhout, 2009

Levy &
Ramim, 2015

Empirical
study via
quasiexperiment

Morcke et al.,
2013

Literature
review and
analysis

Rubin &
Dierdorff,
2009

Empirical
assessment

253 business
management
students

373 U.S.
colleges and
universities

Instrument
or Construct
IS user
competency,
social
cognitive
theory

Main Finding or
Contribution
Developed a
conceptual
foundation of IS
user competency
and proposed an IS
user competency
framework

IT
professional
competence

Developed a
theoretical model of
skills (i.e.,
knowledge,
experiences, and
abilities) desired for
IT specialists

Skills and
competence
assessment

Students with
hands-on
experience (i.e.,
computer
simulation)
performed better
than those without

Outcome
(competency)
based
education

Undergraduate
medical education
programs for nearly
60 years have
utilized outcome
(competency) based
education

MBA
curricula and
managerial
competencies

Competencies in
the classroom were
found necessary to
prepare students for
future employment
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Table 2
Summary of Competence vs. Skills (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Toth & Klein,
2014

Standard

Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Role-based
model for
Federal
IT/cybersecurity
training

Main Finding or
Contribution
Specific
IT/cybersecurity
training for an
individual based on
job function and
responsibilities

Information Technology Skills
One of the main challenges in the study of IT skills is the fact that IT skills have
been measured, predominantly in research, based on self-reported survey instruments
(Levy, 2005; Torkzadeh & Lee, 2003). Adomßent and Hoffman (2013), as well as
Beaudoin, Kurtz, and Eden (2009), identified that competencies are important to
accomplish something successfully and responsibly. Lerouge, Newton, and Blanton
(2005) defined IT skills as those skills that correspond to the technical knowledge
regarding the hardware, software, and programming features of IS. Marakas, Yi, and
Johnson (1998) concluded the increase of technology skills across users is important as
IT becomes a mainstay in the daily lives of individuals. New technologies are adopted by
organizations regularly (Weigel & Hazen, 2014). According to Marcolin et al. (2000),
competence with IT not only empowers users, it has an effect on their workplace
productivity. In order to effectively use IT for the benefit of the organization, a user
needs to acquire skills working with new IS and technologies (Eargle, Taylor, Sawyer, &
Gaskin, 2014). IT skills are essential for an organization to gain competitive equality, but
the management of those IT skills sustain an organization’s competitive advantage (Mata,
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Fuerst, & Barney, 1995). Thus, the importance of assessing those skills warrants
additional research (Levy & Ramim, 2015; Weigel & Hazen, 2014). Table 3 lists a
summary of research studies regarding the importance of IT skills.
Table 3
Summary of Information Technology Skills
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Competencies
in the context
of education
for sustainable
development

Main Finding or
Contribution
Competency is
important to
accomplish an
educational
sustainable
development.

Adomßent
&
Hoffman,
2013

Concept
paper

Beaudoin
et al., 2009

Empirical
study via
survey

318 online
learners from
Western,
Japanese,
Mexican, and
Israeli
countries

System of
knowledge,
experience,
and abilities

Derived a set of
competencies useful
for successful online
learning

Eargle et
al., 2014

Empirical
study via
self-reporting
survey

377 users of
Microsoft
Excel

Skill
acquisition
and
habituation

A person’s skill
acquisition through
multi-purposing is
improved by
comprehensiveness of
use and atypical use

Lerouge et
al., 2005

Empirical
study via
mailed
surveys

124 IS
professionals

IS skill set

A systems analyst
position requires a
multi-faceted skill set,
but the skills were not
ranked equally in
terms of job
importance and
preferred use
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Table 3
Summary of Information Technology Skills (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Learning
skills profile

Main Finding or
Contribution
Skills were positively
enhanced in both the
online and on-campus
MBA programs

Levy, 2005

Empirical
study via
longitudinal
study

2 MBA
programs
(one online
and one oncampus)

Levy &
Ramim,
2015

Empirical
study via
quasiexperiment

253 business
management
students

Skills and
competence
assessment

Students with handson experience (i.e.,
computer simulation)
performed better than
those that did not

Marakas et
al., 1998

Literature
review and
synthesis

40 papers
focused on
the CSE
construct as a
developed
measure or
evaluated as a
variable

Computer
self-efficacy

Negative impacts
associated with
personnel introduced
to IT may be tempered
with increase
computer self-efficacy
through experience
and knowledge

Marcolin et
al., 2000

Empirical
study via
survey and
flash-card
self-efficacy
assessment

66 university End-user
administrators competency
and students

End-users ranked
higher in their
perceived ability to
use a software
package than their
demonstrated
competence level of
the same software

Mata et al.,
1995

Literature
review and
analysis

5 IT-based
sources of
competitive
advantage

Managerial IT skills
were a source of
sustained competitive
edge.

Strategic
management
theory
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Table 3
Summary of Information Technology Skills (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Torkzadeh
& Lee,
2003

Empirical
study via
developed
instrument

282 end-users
from variety
of industries
and
management
levels

Weigel &
Hazen,
2014

Empirical
study

22 IS
graduate
students
employed in
an IT position

Instrument
or Construct
Perceived
end-user
computing
skills

Main Finding or
Contribution
Identified 12 items for
measuring perceived
end user computing
skills, but cautioned
perceptions do not
always correspond to
actual skills

Technology
proficiency
assessment

Addressed the flaws
and consequences of
erroneous selfassessment reporting
by presenting
technology
proficiency
assessment constructs

Data Breaches
From 2005 to 2012, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2014) reported over 607
million records lost from nearly 3,500 data breaches. According to Boritz and No (2011),
in the past government agencies were only involved in egregious privacy breaches. One
and one-half years later, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order No. 13,681
(2014) requiring “the use of multiple factors of authentication and an effective identity
proofing process” (p. 63492) when a U.S. citizen’s personal data is made available
through digital applications. Nearly 1.6 billion records were reported lost from 453 data
breaches during the period of January 2013 to December 2014 and an additional 454
breaches occurred with an unknown number of lost records (Privacy Rights
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Clearinghouse, 2014). According to Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC) (2015), 25%
of the 64 data breaches reported in January 2015 resulted in the exposure of 455,337
individual records. Of the remaining 75%, an unknown number of records were exposed
(ITRC, 2015). Industries affected included banking, business, education, medical and
healthcare, as well as government and military sectors (ITRC, 2015). During 2015, 1,670
data breaches occurred with nearly 50% reporting an unknown number of compromised
data records (Gemalto, 2016). By the end of May 2016, 42% of data breach incidents
resulted in 12 million records compromised (ITRC, 2016). In addition, nearly 400 million
email addresses and passwords of customers associated with LinkedIn and multiple email
providers (i.e., Hotmail, Gmail, Mail.ru, etc.) were found available for sale online
(Identity Force, 2016; Scott, 2016).
Prior research identified the need for research to address the threats to
organizational IS due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Choi et al.,
2013; Jensen et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). More than any other internal process or
technology, breaches were discovered by users armed with the skills needed to quickly
identify and report possible cyber-espionage occurrences (Verizon Enterprise Solutions,
2014). Technology alone cannot guarantee security. A security risk is often accepted by a
user when the countermeasure interferes with work productivity (Choi et al., 2013).
Therefore, the human factor cannot be ignored in corporate security without peril
(Kaspersky Lab, 2013). Most security incidents were attributed to everyday insiders like
current or former employees (PwC, 2013). Since 2003, four of the top nine security
indent patterns (e.g., miscellaneous errors, crimeware, insider misuse, & physical
theft/loss) involved human error or misuse (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2015).
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According to Symantec Corporation (2015), not all insider threats are intentional; 84% of
insider related data breaches reported were due to an unintentional act or failure to secure
a computer or drive. Of the 1,670 data breaches reported in 2015, 38% were due to an
accidental loss or malicious insider (Gemalto, 2016). Moreover, it was noted that
“unfortunately, even the best security mechanisms can be bypassed through social
engineering” (Winkler & Dealy, 1995, p. 1), which “is now considered the great security
threat to people and organizations” (Algarni et al., 2014, p. 1). Even amid those who
classified themselves as being aware of social engineering techniques, Kvedar, Nettis,
and Fulton (2010)’s findings suggested an implemented social engineering plot could
succeed. A user with technology knowledge does not automatically become skilled in
cybersecurity (Choi et al., 2013). In the work of Qin and Burgoon (2007), users had an
18% accuracy in detecting deception. According to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)
(2014), not protecting an organization’s information puts “the reputation, success, and
survival of the organization at risk” (p. 2). An example of this occurred in November
2014 when Sony Pictures suffered a data breach that shut down all e-mail
communications and computer usage due to a hacker posting a threatening message on
company owned computers and obtaining unsecured data files (Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, 2014). Another data breach reported by Anthem identified hackers
compromised work information system credentials of a system administrator, possibly
through email phishing (Mathews & Yadron, 2015). Moreover, malware, use of stolen
credentials, and phishing were identified as the top three cyber threats by Verizon
Enterprise Solutions (2016). However, the skills needed to mitigate such cybersecurity
threats and to protect corporate IT systems from such data breach attacks can be the
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difference between experiencing a breach or not. It appears no one is immune from a
cyber-attack (Verizon Enterprise Solutions, 2016). Thus, the importance of a measure to
assess the level of cybersecurity skills held by a non-IT professional is significant. Table
4 lists a summary of research studies regarding data breaches.
Table 4
Summary of Data Breaches
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Social
engineering

Main Finding or
Contribution
Social engineering
is a threat to SNS
account holders

Algarni et al.,
2014

Empirical
study via
qualitative
survey

Boritz & No,
2011

Literature
review and
synthesis

Framework to
identify key
stakeholders
and their
interactions to
structure ecommerce
privacy
settings

Previous studies on
privacy settings in
e-commerce have
relied on opinions
not actual behaviors
and privacy of
accumulated PII is
an important
growing issue

Choi et al.,
2013

Empirical
study via
expert
reviewed
survey

185
respondents
from a large
government
transportation
agency

Cybersecurity
threats and
vulnerabilities

End user awareness
of monitoring and
cybersecurity
initiative skill
reduced misuse
intentions

Jensen et al.,
2014

Empirical
study via
laboratory
experiment

111 subjects

Effect of color
on key
business
information
retention

The use of color to
highlight critical
information (i.e.,
corporate security
policies) does
increase the enduser’s retention of
that information

78 social
networking
site (SNS)
account
holders
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Table 4
Summary of Data Breaches (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Graduate,
Social
undergraduate, engineering
and high
school
students
attending
simulation

Main Finding or
Contribution
Over 40% did not
perceive social
engineering as a
threat and 85%
gave the attackers
network
information

Kvedar et al.,
2010

Empirical
study via
vulnerability
assessment
simulation

Qin &
Burgoon,
2007

Experimental
study via
interviews

122
community
members and
undergraduate
students

Social
engineering in
a deception
related setting

Human judgment
on deception is
biased and
inaccurate

Winkler &
Dealy, 1995

Case study

Compilation
of large
financial
institutions

Social
engineering

Social engineering
attacks were
successful due to
low cybersecurity
skills

Social Engineering
Social engineering tends to be widely employed and very effective due to human
nature’s frailties and lack of awareness of such dangers at various levels (Siponen, 2001).
Social engineering is a method used by a hacker to navigate around technical security
controls (Jenkins, 2013). A successful social engineering attack is defined as an art of
manipulation, deception, or intrusion (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, 2005; Podhradsky,
D’Ovidio, Engebretson, & Casey, 2013). Every organization has at least one individual
susceptible to a social engineering attack (Mouton, Leenen, Malan, & Venter, 2014). An
attack may be as easy as asking for the sensitive information and newer technologies are
making it even easier (Podhradsky et al., 2013). The number of individuals that can be
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targets of a social engineering attack increases as electronic computing devices prevail
(Mouton et al., 2014). Moreover, social engineering threats are increasing due to new
trends (e.g., Bring Your Own Device) and the use of mobile devices accessing WIS in
insecure environments (i.e., cafés) (Krombholz, Hobel, Huber, & Weippl, 2015). Thus,
examples of social engineering disconfirm the belief that technical security controls
completely secure a system and the user must not be security conscious (Jenkins, 2013).
Vulnerabilities must be identified, assessed, and prioritized by IT management
and individuals (Algarni et al., 2014; Goodman & Lin, 2007). Social engineering scams
do not discriminate against an individual’s age, gender, or education level (Algarni et al.,
2015; Podhradsky et al., 2013). An individual’s knowledge and ability to identify a social
engineering attack lowers a corporation’s access vulnerability (Goodman & Lin, 2007).
However, most individuals in an organization have a willingness to be helpful and that
creates opportunities for a successful social engineering attack (Goodman & Lin, 2007).
Many social engineering techniques (e.g., phishing, identity theft, spamming, etc.) exist
and are used to compromise IT, while attacking individuals or organizations (Algarni et
al., 2014). Furthermore, susceptibility to fall victim to a social engineering attack was
found higher for women and young adults (Algarni et al., 2015). Moreover, all education
levels of non-IT professionals were found susceptible to social engineering victimization
(Algarni et al., 2015). Successful social engineering attacks often involve human
emotions of trust, fear of getting disciplined, compliance, and personal gain (Mitnick &
Simon, 2002; Podhradsky et al., 2013). Thus, this study addressed the development of a
social engineering countermeasure that does not extinguish the individual’s tendency to
help (Goodman & Lin, 2007). Moreover, this study identified the cybersecurity skills
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level of an individual without harm to any existing IT. Table 5 lists a summary of
research studies regarding social engineering and the range of social engineering threats.
Table 5
Summary of Social Engineering
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Insider threats

Jenkins, 2013

Empirical
study via
experiments

2108
participants
from three
studies

Podhradsky et
al., 2013

Empirical
study via
Xbox 360
Elite

3 user profiles Social
on 1 Xbox 360 engineering,
Elite
PII disclosure
in virtual
societies

Siponen, 2001

Theoretical

Information
security
awareness

Main Finding or
Contribution
Demonstrated the
importance
understanding the
risks of weak
security behavior
PII was exposed
even though user
profiles were
deleted.

Dimensions of
information
security awareness
and the respective
target groups were
identified

Malware
According to International Business Machines (IBM) Global Technology Services
(2014), ‘human error’ was identified as a contributing factor in over 95% of all security
incidents investigated. Furthermore, an infected attachment or selecting an unsafe
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) was the most prevalent contributing ‘human error’
when it comes to inflicting malware on computing systems (IBM Global Technology
Services, 2014). Reported cases of malware attacks were not limited to one particular
operating system (i.e., Windows, Mac, iOS, Android) (Chin, Felt, Sekar, & Wagner,
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2012) or type of device (i.e., Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), computer, Point-of-Sale
(POS) terminal, smartphone) (Choo, 2011). Chen, Gu, Zhuge, Nazario, and Han (2011)
identified Web-based malicious software (malware) as an exploiter of client-side
vulnerabilities, pervasive, and hard to block. Malware may also arrive via an e-mail
attachment, which can lead to damaged computers, stolen personal information, and
mount attacks on computers (Comesongsri, 2010). Provos, Rajab, and Mavrommatis
(2009) discussed how an adversary sends a spam e-mail to a user, which then directs the
user to a Webpage with malicious content. Malware infections occur mostly due to users
lured to complete an action that leads to infecting their computer (Lévesque, Nsiempba,
Fernandez, Chiasson, & Somayaji, 2013). A survey of 400 business executives and
technology professionals identified that malware and hacking were top concerns within
their organizations (CompTIA, 2015). Moreover, in the third quarter of 2014, an
estimated 20 million new strands of malware were created (CompTIA, 2015). However,
in the work of Harris, Furnell, and Patten (2014), approximately 6% of the non-IT
participants surveyed were concerned with malware infections appearing on their mobile
devices. This is alarming since both IT and non-IT participants failed to protect their
mobile devices with anti-virus or firewall software (Harris et al., 2014). Min,
Varadharajan, Tupakula, and Hitchens (2014) recommended at least one anti-virus
software installation per device. However, Lévesque et al. (2013) found that 20% of the
participants were infected with some type of malicious software that went undetected by
the installed anti-virus software. Moreover, cyber criminals are focusing malicious
software to attack mobile devices, which then weakens the corporate perimeter-based
defenses as mobile devices are brought in and out of the work environment (He, 2013).
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Malware delivery occurs in the form of an email attachment that included various file
formats (Bere, Bhunu-Shava, Gamundani, & Nhamu, 2015). The flexibility for an end
user to check email via a mobile device increases the risk of malware exposure. Thus, it
appears that users with skills to prevent malware via e-mail or Webpages would reduce
the number of infections. However, a tool to measure such skills does not appear to be
reported in literature, especially of non-IT professionals. A summary of malware and the
vastness of the threats associated with malware is shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Summary of Malware
Study

Methodology

Instrument
or Construct
Malware

Main Finding or
Contribution
Developed and
tested a prototype
that allows review
of malware trails

Chen et al.,
2011

Empirical study 26,498
via prototype
malicious
system
scenarios
from 1,248
distinct sites

Chin et al.,
2012

Empirical study 60 mobile
via structured
device
interview and
owners
survey

Privacy and
security

Smartphone
owners were
hesitant to
complete sensitive
tasks on their
phones

Comesongsri, Empirical study 376 college
2010
via pen and
students
paper survey

Theory of
planned
behavior,
protection
model theory,
and discord

Phishing
protection
intention

He, 2013

Mobile social
media risks
and
mitigation

Mitigation
techniques are
needed to thwart
cyber-attacks and
threats via mobile
social media

Literature and
blog mining
review

Sample

327 mobile
social media
security
blogs
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Table 6
Summary of Malware (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Empirical study Nearly 1,000 Data breaches
via cyberclients in
attack event
133
data
countries

Main Finding or
Contribution
Human error
contributed to over
95% of the
security events

Lévesque et
al., 2013

Empirical study
via real-world
computer usage
and diagnostics

50
participants
recruited on
a university
campus

Malware and
anti-virus
detection

Anti-virus
software does not
detect all
infections or
threats to an IS

Min et al.,
2014

Empirical study 10 antivirus
via
software
vulnerability
programs
testing

Malware
detection

After an antivirus
update, a malware
infection could
occur due to a
design
vulnerability

IBM, 2014

Personally Identifiable Information
PII is defined as information that 1) distinguishes or traces an individual’s
identity, e.g., social security number, biometric records, date and place of birth, and 2)
any data or information associated with an individual, including but not limited to
medical, educational, financial, and employment (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009; U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2008). An exploitation of PII may occur with
a user merely opening a file. Thus, organizations should be aware and isolate all PII
available within their environment, including contractor sites and backup tapes
(McCallister et al., 2010). Individuals participating online via social media are vulnerable
to having their PII leaked to third parties (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009). Furthermore,
the leaked PII may be collected and linked to other personal information, which may
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result in PII theft (Malin, 2005; McCallister et al., 2010). Mitigation for protecting PII
theft is heightened when corporations, e.g., Anthem, Target, Home Depot, etc.,
experience a data breach. Anthem experienced such a data breach in February 2015 and
announced that names, social security numbers, birthdates, and addresses were stolen
(Mathews & Yadron, 2015). South Koreans with higher education degrees were thought
to fall victim to identity theft more often than those without degrees due to work related
duties that involved online activities (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Identity theft was the cause of
more than half (53.2%) of the 888 data breaches that occurred globally in the first half of
2015 (Gemalto, 2015). Furthermore, the United States reported the highest number of
incidents; a total of 671 data breaches (Gemalto, 2015). An example of this occurred in
June 2015 when the Office of Personnel Management announced that PII of 21 million
applicants and 1.1 million non-applicants (e.g., spouses and co-habitants) were part of
two separate data breaches (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2015). This is
alarming when prior research has found that as few as three pieces of personal
information (date of birth, gender, & zip code) uniquely identify 87% of the United States
population (Malin, 2005).
In a study of Facebook profiles, over time individuals shared less PII publicly and
more privately to ‘friends’ (Stutzman, Gross, & Acquisti, 2012). In doing so, Facebook
users shared more PII, sometimes unknowingly, to silent listeners (e.g., third party apps,
advertisers) on the network (Malin, 2005; Stutzman et al., 2012). PII disclosure or theft
may also occur from a trail of PII breadcrumbs collected from Web browsing and later
reconstructed (Airoldi, Bai, & Malin, 2011). Even with the best security mechanisms,
social engineering is a great security threat to PII (Algarni et al., 2014; Winkler & Dealy,
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1995). A user with poor information sharing habits and practices increases risk of PII
exposure (Ball, Ramim, & Levy, 2015). According to Heartfield and Loukas (2013), 90%
of participants were deceived into executing malware that used their computer for
collecting personal information. Thus, a measure to determine the participant’s skill level
of detecting malware will assist in reducing not only an individual’s, but a corporation’s,
vulnerability to PII theft via malware. Table 7 lists a summary of research studies
regarding PII.
Table 7
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Entropy
metric for
assessing
disclosure risk
of distributed
databases

Main Finding or
Contribution
Risk of trail
disclosure and PII
re-identification is
driven by the
quantity of PII
distributed across
databases.

Airoldi et al.,
2011

Empirical
observations
and
controlled
simulated
study

1226 patients
from 231
hospitals, 144
individuals
from 86
households,
1000 subjects
for
simulations

Algarni et al.,
2014

Empirical
study via
qualitative
survey

78 social
networking
site (SNS)
account
holders

Social
engineering

Social engineering
is a threat to SNS
account holders
due to SNSs lack
of mitigation
techniques

Ball et al.,
2015

Empirical
study via
quantitative
survey

390 students
and faculty
members

Personal
information
sharing
awareness,
habits, and
practices

Habits
significantly
influence
practices, which
may expose PII
through social
media and elearning systems
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Table 7
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information (Cont.)
Study
Heartfield &
Loukas, 2013

Methodology Sample
Empirical
study via
experimental
evaluation

Instrument
Main Finding or
or Construct Contribution
20 technically Phishing and
Technical end-totrained
file
end security
university
masquerading solutions in the
students
cloud do not take
the human element
into consideration

Krishnamurthy Empirical
& Wills, 2009 study via
online social
networks

12 online
social
networks

PII

Online social
networks directly
and indirectly
released PII to
third parties

Malin, 2005

Empirical
study via
URL access
data

86 households Reand 144
identification
individuals
accessing
66,000
distinct Web
pages

Paek & Nalla,
2015

Empirical
study

10,671 South
Korean
individuals
aged 14 and
older

Korea Crime
Victim
Survey
(KVCS) 2008

Education level was
positively
correlated to
identity theft
victimizations

Stutzman et
al., 2012

Empirical
study via
longitudinal
panel

5,076
Facebook
users

Social
network
privacy and
disclosure

Although personal
data shared publicly
reduced, the
quantity and score
of personal data
revealed privately
increased

Data trails from
multiple Website
visits, reidentification was
possible and
revealed
relationships
between PII and
unidentifiable data
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Table 7
Summary of Personally Identifiable Information (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Winkler &
Dealy, 1995

Case study

Compilation
of large
financial
institutions

Instrument
or Construct
Social
engineering

Main Finding or
Contribution
Social engineering
attacks were
successful due to
low cybersecurity
skills

Phishing
The term phishing was created by hackers describing the activity of stealing AOL
account information in 1995 (James, 2005; Ryan, 1997). A typical phishing attack occurs
when a victim receives a fraudulent e-mail disguised as a genuine e-mail asking the
recipient to confirm pieces of personal information by clicking on a hyperlink. The
hyperlink leads to the spoofed Website with matching images and logos that appears as
genuine as the legitimate site. A successful phisher may steal valuable financial
information, such as a social security number, bank account details, and credit card
numbers (Huang, Ma, & Chen, 2011) by harvesting the information from the spoofed site
and illegally using it (Davinson & Sillence, 2010).
With detection occurring prior to the phished communication actually reaching
the user, phishing detection methods (i.e., blacklists, whitelists, heuristics, DNS
analyzers, Classifier System, Lookup System, or hybrids) are usually invisible to the user
(Hajgude & Ragha, 2012). Furnell (2007) found that individuals were not attuned to
observe the visual, technical, and language cues involved with phishing e-mails.
According to Paek and Nalla (2015), each additional phishing attempt increased the odds
of identity theft victimization by 2 percent. APWG (2010) and Phish Tank (2009)
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identified threats to frequently targeted markets (auction, financial, payment services, &
retail). APWG (2014) reported the same targeted markets plus the addition of ISPs,
classifieds, gaming, government, and social media. Many approaches from artificial
intelligence to SETA programs attempt to mitigate the challenge of cyber threats.
Phishing may be compared to purse snatching. The threat of purse snatching has existed
for as long as purses have existed, and yet, it occurs every day (Weber, 2012). Numerous
attempts to solve the phishing threat exist and despite those efforts the user continues to
fall victim to attacks. Thus, users with the skill to identify phishing attempts would
reduce the loss of PII along with confidential corporate information. A summary of
research studies regarding phishing and end user vulnerabilities are listed in Table 8.
Table 8
Summary of Phishing
Study

Methodology Sample

Davinson
& Sillence,
2010

Empirical
study via
experimental
groups

64 staff and
students

Furnell,
2007

Empirical
study

415 Internet
users

Hajgude &
Ragha,
2012

Literature
review and
synthesis

Instrument
or Construct
Health belief
model

Main Finding or
Contribution
Providing information
about the risk
involved improved
security behavior

Phishing

End users cannot rely
solely on technical,
visual, and language
cues of phishing
messages

Phishing
detection

Proposed a phishing
detection algorithm
that combined
blacklist, white list,
and heuristic analysis
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Table 8
Summary of Phishing (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Huang et
al., 2011

Conceptual
paper

Paek &
Nalla,
2015

Empirical
study

10,671 South
Korean
individuals
aged 14 and
older

Instrument
or Construct
Phishing
mitigation
and one-time
passwords

Main Finding or
Contribution
Proposed
authentication system
to reduce phished
login credentials

Korea Crime
Victim
Survey
(KVCS) 2008

Identity theft
victimization was
correlated to number
of phishing attempts
received

Social Media
Social media networks have four essential features: “1) a digital profile, 2) search
and privacy, 3) relational ties, and 4) network transparency” (Kane, Alavi, Labianca, &
Borgatti, 2014, p. 284). Because users of e-mail or electronic discussion boards do not
establish a profile, nor is searching or viewing a list of connections allowed by others,
Kane et al. (2014)’s definition does not include e-mail or electronic discussion boards.
Although social media networks provide many benefits, users suffer harm when their
personal information is lost, stolen, or wrongly accessed (Romanosky, Hoffman, &
Acquisti, 2013). According to Chhabra, Aggarwal, Benevenuto, and Kumaraguru (2011),
the accessibility to a large group of gullible users on an open platform attracted
adversaries to lure victims with shortened URLs within social media networks (i.e.,
Orkut, Habbo, & Facebook). Geographically, the USA was found among the targeted
countries, while Facebook, Orkut, and Twitter combined accounted for two-thirds of
phishing URLs from social media networks (Chhabra et al., 2011). A threat to social
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media network users may be a vulnerable friend or other community attributes
(Gundecha, Barbier, & Liu, 2011). Furthermore, Gundecha et al. (2011) identified that a
user’s privacy was impacted by each new friend. Users were either not cautious or not
aware of their friends’ security and privacy concerns (Gundecha et al., 2011). Protection
for/from social media networks (i.e., Facebook & Twitter) was identified as an
organization’s IT security weak spot by 763 IT security decision makers and practitioners
representing 11 countries in North America and Europe (Cyberedge Group, 2014).
Moreover, social engineering victimization may be predicted by a non-IT professional’s
age, gender, security knowledge, and elapsed time in joining Facebook (Algarni et al.,
2015). Without social engineering skills (i.e., knowledge, experience, & abilities), 62.5%
were victimized by a social engineering attack (Bullée, Montoya, Pieters, Junger, &
Hartel, 2015). Thus, it appears skill in protecting PII via social media networks would
assist in not only strengthening an individual’s identity, but also an organization’s IT
security. A summary of research studies regarding social media and how it was
introduced follows in Table 9.
Table 9
Summary of Social Media
Study

Methodology Sample

Algarni et al.,
2015

Empirical
study

7,540
Facebook
profile
observations

Instrument
or Construct
Social
engineering

Main Finding or
Contribution
Susceptibility to
cybersecurity threat
victimization
predicted by
demographics
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Table 9
Summary of Social Media (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
118 University Social
building
engineering
occupants
training

Main Finding or
Contribution
Social engineering
knowledge,
experience, and
abilities reduced the
number of victims

Bullée et al.,
2015

Empirical
study

Chhabra et al.,
2011

Empirical
study via
social media

6,474
shortened
URLs directed
to phished
sites

PII theft via
social media
and shortened
URL services

Phishers presented
shortened URLs on
social media to lure
victims

Cyberedge
Group, 2014

Empirical
study via
Web-based
survey

763 IT
security
decision
makers and
practitioners

Cyber threats

Potential insider
threats and having
the necessary tools
to investigate
security breaches
were a higher
concern than any
external threat
source

Gundecha et
al., 2011

Empirical
study via
Facebook
profiles

100,000
Facebook
users

Social media
networks

Introduced an
approach to
vulnerabilities that
exist due to a
friend’s security
settings on social
media site

Kane et al.,
2014

Theoretical

Social media
networks

Identified a
framework for
evaluating and
discussing the use
of social media in
empirical research
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Table 9
Summary of Social Media (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Romanosky et
al., 2013

Empirical
analysis

1,772 U.S.
data breach
observations

Instrument
or Construct
Data breach
litigation and
settlement

Main Finding or
Contribution
Lawsuits involving
PII theft were
settled more often
than litigated

Work Information Systems Security
Information systems are expected by society to “do what is required and expected
of them despite environmental disruption, human user and operator errors, and attacks by
hostile parties” (Goodman & Lin, 2007, p. 1). To address these expectations, user
interfaces have seen updates to include security pop-up windows (Hong, 2012), inhibitive
attractors (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2013), and domain-highlighting (Lin et al., 2011). Current
or prior employees present the greatest security threat to WIS as accidental harm or
exposure to external threats may occur due to lack of cybersecurity skills (Jacob &
Antony, 2014). Organizations and individuals rely on the embedded security features of
the IT products and services sold on the open market (Peha, 2013). The use of mobile
devices has increased exploits in the workplace by 52% (PwC, 2016). Whitman (2004)
noted that human error or failures were the highest threat to information security. Even
with the best security mechanisms, a well-planned and executed social engineering attack
could succeed (Kvedar et al., 2010; Winkler & Dealy, 1995). Information security
incidents globally increased 38% in 2015 (PwC, 2016). Without a cybersecurity skilled
workforce to combat cyber-attacks, a work information system’s vulnerability increases
as the aggressive cybercriminals continue to escalate the frequency, severity, and impact
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of cyber-attacks (PwC, 2016). Table 10 lists a summary of research studies regarding
work information systems security and threat mitigation methods.
Table 10
Summary of Work Information Systems Security
Study

Methodology Sample

Bravo-Lillo et Empirical
al., 2013
study via
online handson tasks

Goodman &
Lin, 2007

Hong, 2012

Literature
review and
synthesis

Literature
review

A total of
3,722
Amazon’s
Mechanical
Turk workers
over three
experiments

Instrument
or Construct
Security
warning
dialogue
design

Main Finding or
Contribution
Inhibitive attractors
reduced the threat
of end users
installing
illegitimate
software, granting
dangerously
excessive
permissions to PII
online, and habitual
ignoring of a
familiar security
warning

Cybersecurity
research

Cybersecurity
threats,
vulnerabilities, and
future research
opportunities in the
U.S.

Phishing

History of phishing
attacks and
identified the
importance of
including the
human element in
researching
solutions
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Table 10
Summary of Work Information Systems Security (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
Main Finding or
or Construct Contribution
Graduate,
Social
At a network
undergraduate, engineering vulnerability
and high
focused event, over
school
40% did not
students
perceive social
attending
engineering as a
simulation
threat and 85% gave
the attackers
network information

Kvedar et
al., 2010

Empirical
study via
vulnerability
assessment
simulation

Lin et al.,
2011

Empirical
study via
controlled
experiment

22 university
students and
staff

Domainhighlighting,
phishing
mitigation

Phishing mitigation
tools were not used
at all times by endusers

Whitman,
2004

Empirical
study via
online survey

192 top
computing
executives

IS security
threats

Human error was
among the dominant
costs of
unintentional IS
security threats

Winkler &
Dealy, 1995

Case study

Compilation
of large
financial
institutions

Social
engineering

Social engineering
was successful due
to low cybersecurity
skills

Confidential Information Exposure
One successful deployment of a social engineering technique is all it takes to
compromise corporate information (McAfee Labs, 2014). The departments holding the
most sensitive data were the least successful at detecting legitimate or illegitimate e-mail
messages (McAfee Labs, 2014). In the work of Qin and Burgoon (2007), users detected
deception with an 18% accuracy rate. Even among those who classified themselves as
being aware of social engineering techniques, Kvedar et al. (2010)’s findings suggested
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that an implemented social engineering plot could succeed. Social engineering can bypass
even the best security mechanisms (Winkler & Dealy, 1995). The exposure of
confidential information through social engineering is a great security threat to people
and organizations (Algarni et al., 2014).
Social engineering is not the only threat to the exposure of confidential
information. Confidential information disclosure may occur by an employee conducting
unsecure activities, while at work or at home. One such example involves an investment
specialist at Morgan Stanley that admitted to illegally downloading confidential
information of about 350,000 clients; the details of how that information was uploaded to
an open file sharing site is unknown (Baer, 2015). According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)’s investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s director,
General David Petraeus, an employee in a classified position was performing unsecure
Internet activities which heightened national security concerns (Barrett, Perez, &
Gorman, 2012). The U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors’
Office of Inspector General (OIG) (2012) reported the Ambassador of Kenya ordered a
commercial Internet connection be installed in the bathroom of his embassy office in lieu
of the secure Internet connection provided by the Department of State. Furthermore, the
Ambassador demanded the information management staff use a commercial email system
in lieu of the department email system (U.S. Department of State & the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, 2012). Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s cybersecurity
skill level was questioned while she explained the convenience of using a personal email
address to conduct official government operations instead of a government issued email
address (Clinton, 2015). Furthermore, an individual volunteering information on a social
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networking Website (e.g., Facebook or MySpace) creates a social engineering
vulnerability not only to the individual, but to their workplace and co-workers (Mills,
2009). Each of these incidents were a breeding ground for potential confidential
information exposure (Kozak, Iefremova, Szkola, & Sas, 2014; Spirin, 2014). Thus, it
appears a measure to evaluate the user’s skill level at protecting confidential information
will help to mitigate exposure and strengthen IT security. Moreover, reports of such a
measure appears absent in literature, especially of non-IT professionals. Table 11 lists a
summary of research studies regarding confidential information exposure.
Table 11
Summary of Confidential Information Exposure
Study

Methodology Sample

Algarni et
al., 2014

Empirical
study via
qualitative
survey

78 social
networking site
(SNS) account
holders

Kozak et
al., 2014

Empirical
study

26,937 email
addresses from
2,000
published
articles

Instrument
or
Construct
Social
engineering

Main Finding or
Contribution

Sharing of
email
addresses

Use of institutional
email address may link
an end-user to other
PII, but the effect of
using a noninstitutional email
account for scholarly
communications is
unknown

Social engineering is a
threat to SNS account
holders due to SNSs
lack of mitigation
techniques
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Table 11
Summary of Confidential Information Exposure (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or
Construct
Graduate,
Social
undergraduate, engineering
and high
school
students
attending
simulation

Main Finding or
Contribution

Kvedar et
al., 2010

Empirical
study via
vulnerability
assessment
simulation

At a network
vulnerability focused
event, over 40% did
not perceive social
engineering as a threat
and 85% gave the
attackers network
information

Qin &
Burgoon,
2007

Experimental
study via
interviews

122
community
members and
undergraduate
students

Social
engineering in
a deception
related setting

Human judgment on
deception is biased and
inaccurate

Winkler
& Dealy,
1995

Case study

Compilation
of large
financial
institutions

Social
engineering

Social engineering
attacks were successful
due to low
cybersecurity skills

Password Exploitations
Since the 1960s, a common method of authentication is text-based passwords
(Wilkes, 1968). In an evaluation of the Multics system, passwords were singled out as a
weak point (Saltzer, 1974). Of the 621 confirmed data breaches and thousands of security
incidents reported in 2013, 76% were due to weak or stolen credentials (Verizon
Enterprise Solutions, 2013). According to Gaw and Felten (2006), a new password was
not created for each new account; password reuse was increasing. In addition, online
password management tools and accounts were found to contribute to poor password
practices (Gaw & Felten, 2006). The creation of a digital identity ecosystem became a
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national security priority for the U.S. Government in 2011 due to users accumulating
online identities and having difficulty in managing their respective credentials (Bauer,
Bravo-Lillo, Fragkaki, & Melicher, 2013). Moreover, the threat of a password
exploitation was found with 61% of the IT and non-IT students surveyed as they allowed
applications to store their authentication credentials (Harris et al., 2014). Furthermore,
password exploitation threat was heighted with authentication credentials absent on
nearly 72% of IT and non-IT student-owned smartphones, tablets, and laptops/PCs
(Harris et al., 2014).
Ives, Walsh, and Schneider (2004) identified when users frequently re-use
passwords, “a domino effect can result as one site’s password file falls prey to a hacker
who then uses it to infiltrate other systems, potentially revealing additional password files
that could lead to the failure of other systems” (p. 76). An end-user’s disregard of
instructions to create a unique password for a Website increases the risk of password
exploitations (Grimes, Marquardson, & Nunamaker, 2014). In October 2014, Dropbox
clarified that a hacker attack may have stolen login credentials from other sites and
attempted to use them to access Dropbox accounts (MacMillan & Yadron, 2014). Even
though reusing login credentials makes it easier to remember account details, it places
individuals and organizations at a greater security risk (MacMillan & Yadron, 2014).
Verizon Enterprise Solutions (2014) reported a stolen password from a POS vendor was
the same for each organization managed by the vendor. Armed with information of the
vendor’s customer base, the attacker was then able to use the stolen password for gaining
access and installing malicious code to capture transmitted data (Verizon Enterprise
Solution, 2014). In October 2014, J. P. Morgan Chase & Company disclosed in a
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regulatory filing that data related to 76 million households and 7 million small businesses
were compromised (J. P. Morgan Chase & Company, 2014). It is suspected an
employee’s personal computer infected with malware was the culprit that allowed
intruders access to J. P. Morgan Chase & Company’s network via the employee’s virtual
private network password (Glazer & Yadron, 2014). Of the financial malware gang
incidents reported, 24% were due to the Dyre Wolf harvesting employee and customer
credentials for access to “business banking, corporate banking, treasury management, and
high-value accounts” (Kessem, 2016, p. 12). Thus, it appears skill in password usage
would assist in protecting an organization’s information and enhance IT security. Table
12 lists a summary of research studies regarding password exploitations. Table 12 lists a
summary of research studies regarding password exploitations.
Table 12
Summary of Password Exploitations
Study

Methodology Sample

Bauer et al.,
2013

Empirical
study via
survey

Gaw & Felten, Empirical
2006
study via
laboratory
exercise and
online survey

424 Amazon
Mechanical
Turk
participants in
three separate
Human
Intelligence
Tasks
58 completed
online survey,
49 completed
laboratory
exercise

Instrument
or Construct
PII and single
sign-on

Main Finding or
Contribution
Consent dialogs
were ineffective as
participants were
unable to identify
the PII data types
passed to service
providers

Management
strategies of
passwords for
online
accounts

Poor password
practices were
identified as a result
of the nature of
online accounts and
password
management tool
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Table 12
Summary of Password Exploitations (Cont.)
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
227 IT and
Security of
non-IT college mobile
students
devices

Main Finding or
Contribution
Lack of use and
improper storing of
authentication
credentials
heightened the risk
of password
exploitations

Harris et al.,
2014

Empirical
study via two
surveys

Ives et al.,
2004

Literature
review and
synthesis

Password
reuse

End-users reuse of
passwords is a
security threat and
increases the
vulnerability of
each IS accessed
with the same
password

Saltzer, 1974

Case study

Multics
system

Protected
information was at
risk of exposure
due to nine
identified design
flaws

Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is “the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby
information and communications systems and the information contained therein are
protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or
exploitation” (National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS), 2014,
Cybersecurity section, para. 1). Cybersecurity also includes the restoration of digital
information and communications (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1). The International Organization
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for Standardization (ISO) / International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) established
ISO/IEC 27002 (2013) as the code of practice for organizations to apply information
security controls. These information security controls include that employee education is
conducted on a regular basis to ensure the appropriate information security skills and
qualifications are maintained (ISO/IEC, 2013; Spruit & Röling, 2014). An end-user
without the skill to use a cybersecurity tool or an unusable cybersecurity tool translates
into a potential information security breach (Nurse, Creese, Goldsmith, & Lamberts,
2011). Therefore, including the human and social aspects in the cybersecurity system
development processes encourages cybersecurity tool usage (Nurse et al., 2011).
The protection of information remains in the most vulnerable spot (Mitnick &
Simon, 2002). Humans, despite their intellect, are the most severe threat to an
individual’s security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Information is valuable and knowledge
protects information from progressively sophisticated cybersecurity threats (ERM, 2014).
Therefore, cybersecurity skills correspond to an individual’s technical knowledge, ability,
and experience surrounding the hardware and software required to execute IS security
(Choi et al., 2013). Limited cybersecurity skills contribute to the behavior of users that
causes human errors, often times unintentional (Choi, 2013). Furthermore, the need for
users to demonstrate cybersecurity skills is not limited to a single occupation or
profession (Burley et al., 2014). Likewise, a technology savvy user does not
automatically make a cybersecurity savvy user (Choi et al., 2013). Thus, it appears that a
non-IT professional with limited cybersecurity skills presents opportunities for
organizational information vulnerabilities and threats (Thomson & von Solms, 2005).
Table 13 lists a summary of research studies regarding cybersecurity.
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Table 13
Summary of Cybersecurity
Study

Methodology Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Cybersecurity
and critical
infrastructure

Main Finding or
Contribution
Defines cybersecurity
and provides
recommendations for
protecting the critical
infrastructure

Axelrod,
2006

Literature
review and
synthesis

Burley et al.,
2014

Literature
review and
synthesis

Choi, 2013

Empirical
study via
Web-based
survey

185 working
professionals
at a U.S.
government
agency

Cybersecurity
threats and
vulnerabilities

Cybersecurity
skills reduce an
end user’s
computer misuse
intention

Choi et al.,
2013

Empirical
study via
expert
reviewed
survey

185
respondents
from a large
government
transportation
agency in a
Northeastern
U.S.
metropolitan

Cybersecurity
threats and
vulnerabilities

End user
awareness of
policies increased
cybersecurity
action skills

Nurse et al.,
2011

Literature
review and
synthesis

Cybersecurity
usability and
humancomputer
interaction and
security

Guidelines for
extending ISO/IEC
27002 into
measuring the
usability of a
cybersecurity tool

Spruit &
Röling, 2014

Development
research

Information
Security Focus
Area Maturity
Model
(ISFAM)

ISFAM enables an
organization to set
up and measure its
current information
security maturity

Cybersecurity
All employees, IT
professionalism and non-IT, need
cybersecurity skills
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Cybersecurity Skills Shortage
A strong security posture cannot exist without a team of security professionals to
combat the organization’s “complex and serious internal and external threats” (Ponemon
Institute, 2014b, p. 2). And yet, Ponemon Institute (2014b) found the IT security function
understaffed at 70% of organizations surveyed. People that want to use their
cybersecurity skills for good and not evil are difficult to locate (Rastello & Smialek,
2013). Furnell and Moore (2014) found that 57% of digital leaders surveyed indicated
enhanced IT skills are needed in the existing workforce. Thus, suggesting that there is a
notable gap between actual IT skills within organizations and those IT skills believed to
be needed (Furnell & Moore, 2014). IS security positions are predicted to grow 37% from
2012 to 2022 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). According to the commissioner for the
Air Force Association’s CyberPatriot contest, feeding the technical workforce starts with
getting teenagers excited about science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) in
middle school; waiting until high school was too late (Rastello & Smialek, 2013). Nearly
3,900 young adults, ages 18 to 26, from 12 different countries want jobs using cyber
skills, but 58% were not taught cybersecurity skills in the classroom (Raytheon - National
Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA), 2015). An average of 22 staff members were reported
in an IT security function in 2013 with an expected growth to an average of 29 members
in 2014 (Ponemon Institute, 2014b). The increase need of workers with cybersecurity
skills is likely to persist at least until education and training catch up (Burning Glass
Technologies, 2015).
The demand for employees with skills to protect computer networks and the
information contained within those systems will continue to rise as cyber-attacks increase
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(U.S. Department of Labor, 2014). Furthermore, hackers have the skills and tactics to
exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals, industries, or governments conducting
transactions online (Cox, 2015). “As long as the threat exists, there would seem to be
sufficient demand for cybersecurity services” (Libicki et al., 2014, p. 76). In addition to
the persistent threat, the government’s interest in cybersecurity is a major driver in the
demand for those with cybersecurity skills (Libicki et al., 2014). In an attempt to recruit
and retain professionals with cybersecurity skills, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed
Senate Bill 1691 (2014) to grant the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the
authority to hire qualified experts in an expedited manner at a competitive salary, as well
as more benefits and incentives (Chabrow, 2014). People with good cybersecurity skills
may be used in many related specialties; all do not obtain a computer science degree
(Libicki et al., 2014). Cybersecurity is not exclusively a technical undertaking; an
effective national cybersecurity workforce requires a vast range of backgrounds and skills
(National Research Council (NRC), 2013). Furthermore, information security
practitioners were resistant of attempts to isolate cybersecurity into a single profession in
the United Kingdom (Reece & Stahl, 2015). Cybersecurity is a people problem, which
requires a people solution (Spidalieri & Kern, 2014). One of the main initiatives of The
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) is to encourage the expansion
of cyber education by developing a cyber-skilled workforce, while establishing an
effective pipeline for future employees (U.S. National Security Council, 2011).
Interviews with self-proclaimed hackers identified the importance of the public in
defending against cyber terrorism (Cox, 2015). There is a “demand for skilled workers to
secure critical infrastructure and cyberspace” (Spidalieri & Kern, 2014, p. 1).
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Furthermore, identifying an individual’s poor security practices will assist in
strengthening the United States’ collective defense against cyber terror (Cox, 2015).
Thus, this study assisted in the identification and measurement of cyber-skilled
individuals. A summary of research studies regarding cybersecurity skills shortage
follows in Table 14.
Table 14
Summary of Cybersecurity Skills Shortage
Study

Methodology

Cox, 2015

Website
reviews and
interviews

Furnell &
Moore, 2014

Empirical
study via
survey

Libicki et al., Literature
2014
review and
analysis

Reece &
Stahl, 2015

Empirical
study via
interviews

Sample

Instrument
or Construct
Several hundred Cyber
terrorism
terrorism
Websites and
43 selfproclaimed
hacker
interviews

Main Finding or
Contribution
Cybersecurity
skilled
individuals assist
in strengthening
the U.S.’ defense
against cyber
terror

419 respondents Security
from a UK
literacy
science and
technology
showcase event

Initiatives are
needed to
improve security
literacy (i.e.,
cybersecurity
skills)

Cybersecurity There is a high
manpower
demand for
cybersecurity
experts in
industry as well
as the
government
18 UK
Professionalization Practitioners are
information of information
resistant of
security
security
attempts to the
practitioners
professionalization
of information
security.
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Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools
Cybersecurity involves both technical and human ability “to protect or defend
against cyber-attacks” (CNSS, 2010, p. 22). Risk is defined as “a measure of the extent to
which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically a
function of: (i) the adverse impacts that would rise if the circumstance or event occurs;
and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence” (NIST, 2006). Therefore, cybersecurity risk
describes any disruption of operations and monetary loss caused by a malicious cyber
event (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2013; NIST, 2014). An organization or individual
“prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-reducing
controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process” (CNSS,
2010, p. 62) is defined as risk mitigation. According to Maxion and Reeder (2005), risk
mitigation is necessary to protect IS systems as humans making mistakes compromise IS
security. These mistakes include unprotected sensitive files, erroneously configured
systems, and mistakenly sending clear text to correspondents (Maxion & Reeder, 2005).
Malware as an attack tool appears in many forms, i.e., trojans, virus, worms, rogueware,
and is delivered through spam, phishing, and drive-by downloads; each of which involves
human interaction (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Moreover, according to Jang-Jaccard
and Nepal (2014), common hardware attacks involved hardware trojans, illegal clones,
and side channel attacks, i.e., snooping hardware signals. Whereas, common software
attacks included software programming bugs (e.g., memory management, user input
validation, race conditions, user access privileges, etc.). Likewise, networking protocol
attacks and network monitoring and sniffing were the most common network attacks
(Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). As technologies (e.g., social media, cloud computing,
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critical infrastructure, embedded systems & sensors, etc.) emerge, the need to mitigate
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities increases (Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014;
Ransbotham, Mitra, & Ramsey, 2012). In response to the cybersecurity threats “placing
the Nation’s security, economy, and public safety and health at risk” (NIST, 2014, p. 1),
President Obama issued an Executive Order No. 13,636 (2013) to address the need for
improving the critical infrastructure systems. Executive Order No. 13,636 (2013)
established that “the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of
the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber-environment that encourages
efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while promoting safety, security,
business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties” (p. 11739). Furthermore, the
Executive Order 13,636 (2013) summons for the making of the ‘Cybersecurity
Framework’ that includes “a set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes
that align policy, business, and technological approaches to address cyber risks” (p.
11741).
Through government and private sector collaboration, NIST (2014) created a
common language, cost effective, non-regulatory ‘Cybersecurity Framework’ that
addresses and manages cybersecurity risk. According to NIST (2014), the ‘Framework’ is
to complement, not replace, an organization’s risk mitigation and cybersecurity program.
Based on the existing standards, guidelines, and practices, the ‘Framework’ is scalable
and evolving as technology advances and business requires (NIST, 2014). It is
technology neutral to provide a flexible and risk-based implementation that may be used
with a broad array of cybersecurity risk management processes (NIST, 2014). The
‘Framework Core’ consists of five functions identified by industry as helpful in
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managing cybersecurity risk (NIST, 2014). These functions (Identify, Protect, Detect,
Respond, & Recover) assist management of cybersecurity activities at their highest level
(NIST, 2014). As described in NIST (2014), the functions may be performed
simultaneously and continuously to build an operational culture that tackles the dynamic
cybersecurity risk. To grant discussion on how this research fits within the Cybersecurity
Framework, each function definition follows.
•

Identify – Develop the organizational understanding to manage cybersecurity
risk to systems, assets, data, and capabilities, i.e., asset management, business
environment, governance, risk assessment, and risk management strategy;

•

Protect – Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure
delivery of critical infrastructure services, i.e., access control, awareness and
training, data security, information protection processes and procedures,
maintenance, and protective technology;

•

Detect – Development and implement the appropriate activities to identify the
occurrence of a cybersecurity event, i.e., anomalies and events, security
continuous monitoring, and detection processes;

•

Respond – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action
regarding a detected cybersecurity event, i.e., response planning,
communications, analysis, mitigation, and improvements;

• Recover – Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans
for resilience and restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to
a cybersecurity event, i.e., recovery planning, improvements, and
communications. (NIST, 2014, pp. 8-9)
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The five core functions’ concurrent and continual cyclical nature are represented in
Figure 2.

Recover

Identify

Protect

Respond
Detect

Figure 2. NIST’s cybersecurity framework functions
A human element exists in each function. Thus, the CSI benchmarking index
assists in identifying cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals by providing scenariosbased, hands-on tasks to measure those skills. This identification assists in protecting the
cybersecurity risk areas. Individuals not scoring at an acceptable competency threshold
level may be restricted access until the necessary skills are identified above the
acceptable competency threshold level measured by the CSI. An individual with
cybersecurity skills demonstrates through the CSI benchmarking index the skills
necessary in detecting anomalies and malicious cybersecurity events in a timely manner.
Furthermore, the CSI benchmarking index documents the individual’s existing skills and
competencies levels in responding to a set of cybersecurity tasks. Over time as an
individual obtains additional knowledge, experience, and ability, the individual’s skills
levels increase, and ultimately their competency is achieved (Eschenbrenner & Nah,
2014; Marcolin et al., 2000). Therefore, the CSI assists in the continuous monitoring of
cybersecurity skills needed to mitigate and recover from cybersecurity risks, which
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encourages a strong critical infrastructure. Moreover, the CSI benchmarking index
promotes the adoption of the ‘Cybersecurity Framework’ (PwC, 2014). Table 15 lists a
summary of cybersecurity risk mitigation and tools.
Table 15
Summary of Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools
Study

Methodology

Sample

Eschenbrenner Literature
& Nah, 2014
review and
synthesis

Jang-Jaccard
Literature
& Nepal, 2014 review and
synthesis

Marcolin et
al., 2000

Empirical
study via
survey and
flash-card
self-efficacy
assessment

66 university
administrators
and students

Maxion &
Reeder, 2005

Empirical
study via
laboratory
study

24 university
students and
research staff

Instrument
or Construct
IS user
competency,
social
cognitive
theory

Main Finding or
Contribution
Developed a
conceptual
foundation of IS
user competency
and proposed an IS
user competency
framework

Cybersecurity
vulnerabilities
and emerging
threats

Mitigation of
cybersecurity
threats should
include all levels
(e.g., IT & non-IT
professionals) of
end-users

End-user
competency

End-users
demonstrated less
competence than
their perceived
ability to use a
software package

Human error,
filepermission
settings

Human error in
file-permission
settings were
mitigated with an
user-interface
designed with the
external sub-goal
support design
principle
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Table 15
Summary of Cybersecurity Risk Mitigation and Tools (Cont.)
Study

Methodology

Ransbotham
et al., 2012

Empirical
analysis

Sample

Instrument
Main Finding or
or Construct Contribution
333 exploited Exploitations Vulnerabilities
vulnerabilities of
disclosed through
from three
vulnerabilities markets reduces
databases
by attackers
attack penetration,
risk, and volume

Summary of What is Known and Unknown
A review of various aspects of skills, cybersecurity, and data breaches was
conducted to provide the foundation for this research study. A description of what is
known and unknown is provided with this literature review. Through this review of the
literature, various data breaches and skills were identified as they relate to cybersecurity.
Moreover, it was found that cybersecurity skills are fundamental as a risk mitigation tool
and yet there is a cybersecurity skills shortage among non-IT professionals.
Skills are acquired in a three stage incremental learning process (Anderson, 1982;
Gravill et al., 2006). The maturing of knowledge also improves an individual’s skills,
which develops user competency (Toth & Klein, 2014; Rubin & Dierdorff, 2009). When
measuring an individual’s skills, Gravill et al. (2006) as well as Torkzadeh and Lee
(2003) cautioned that individuals did not accurately self-report or perceive their actual
skill levels. Prior literature (i.e., Katz, 1974; Swanson, 2004) identified the effectiveness
of hands-on tasks for increasing employee’s skills. Levy and Ramim (2015) found
students with hands-on experience (i.e., computer simulation) performed better than those
without. In the work of Vassiliou et al. (2014), observable hands-on skills were found to
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provide an unbiased evidence of competence required in the medical and health
profession. The use of scenario-based, hands-on skill assessments found in the aviation,
medical, and transportation appears applicable to cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals. A benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs
identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks appears to be absent from
literature. Thus, this research study designed, developed, and empirically tested a
benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs identified cybersecurity
skills using observable hands-on tasks. Furthermore, the benchmarking index
operationalized into an iPad app that assesses the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT
professionals.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview of Research Design
This research study was classified as a developmental research. Developmental
research tries to answer how the construction of a ‘thing’ addresses a problem (Ellis &
Levy, 2009). Richey and Klein (2014) defined developmental research as a way to
“create knowledge grounded in data systematically derived from practice” (p. 1).
According to Ellis and Levy (2009), developmental research is comprised of three major
elements: 1) product criteria is established and validated; 2) process for product
development is accepted and formalized; as well as 3) determination of the product’s
criteria is met through a formalized, accepted process. In the work of Tracey and Richey
(2007), a systematic process was used to develop and then validate their model using the
Delphi technique where an expert panel analyzed along with offering feedback on the
proposed design. After suggested revisions were analyzed and incorporated, their model
was validated by the Delphi technique (Tracey, 2009). Figure 3 illustrates the research
design this study followed. To begin Phase One, the site approval letter and Institutional
Review Board (IRB) approval were obtained as seen in Appendices A and B,
respectively. Thus, Phase One of this developmental research study utilized an expertreview process following the Delphi technique to design and validate the scenarios-based,
hands-on benchmarking index for measuring cybersecurity skills (Ramim & Lichvar,
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2014). Therefore, Phase Two of this study operationalized the previously developed and
validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index into an iPad app that was used
to assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Furthermore, Phase Three of
this research study used the previously developed and validated iPad app to conduct a
quantitative empirical study by collecting data from 188 non-IT professionals and
documenting the results of the measure. The main research question that this study
addressed is: What tasks enable the validation of a hierarchical measure for observable
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals? A group of 188 non-IT professionals were
contacted to empirically test the developed CSI.

Figure 3. Overview of the Research Design Process
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Instrument Development
Choi (2013) recognized the lack of research involving cybersecurity skills, and
the need for a measure to assess cybersecurity skills. Furthermore, Choi (2013) identified
self-reported surveys as a limitation of research due to a participant’s reluctance to report
actual misuse behavior. Whereas, Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) cautioned self-reported
perceived skills do not always correspond to the individual’s actual skills. In the work of
Gravill et al. (2006), the use of paper versus computer self-reported evaluative measures
varied more in accuracy than self-reported factual information, i.e., years of experience.
Xu and Yeh (2012) adjusted for the varying individualities of the assessors that may
create biases in the self-assessment process. Weigel and Hazen (2014) argued that
practitioners needed an instrument that would measure both perceived and actual
technical skills of employees. Senior executives are a critical element to promoting safe
computing practices to employees (Tarafdar, D’Arcy, Turel, & Gupta, 2015). The U.S.
National Security Council has developed CNCI, and one of its main initiatives is to:
Initiative #8: Expand cyber education. While billions of dollars are being spent
on new technologies to secure the U.S. Government in cyberspace, it is the people
with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to implement those technologies
who will determine success. However, there are not enough cybersecurity experts
within the Federal Government or private sector to implement the CNCI, nor is
there an adequately established Federal cybersecurity career field. Existing
cybersecurity training and personnel development programs, while good, are
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limited in focus and lack unity of effort. In order to effectively ensure our
continued technical advantage and future cybersecurity, we must develop a
technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce and an effective pipeline of
future employees. It will take a national strategy, similar to the effort to upgrade
science and mathematics education in the 1950’s, to meet this challenge. (U.S.
National Security Council, 2011, para. 17)
Yet, the existing measures of cybersecurity skills are dated and limited. Additional work
is needed to develop a measure based on scenarios that emulate real-life cases of
cybersecurity attacks. Moreover, with the shift from desktop to laptop computers, and in
the past decade to mobile devices, there is a need to ensure such measures are not tied to
specific platform and/or operating system. Therefore, this study began by developing a
list of the top platform independent skills that form a basis for the set of scenarios that
capture potential cybersecurity threats.
With the vast shift into mobile computing and the seamless move between devices
that the majority of current employees are engaged in, a critical need emerges to ensure
that prior to uncovering the list of the skills, a set of platform independent threats were
identified. A list of matching skills needed by non-IT professionals were then developed
that formed the foundation for the development of the specific scenarios. For example,
the threat of malware via e-mail attachment can be evaluated via an activity within an email attack scenario that provides participants with a list of e-mails in an inbox asking
them to identify potential harmful messages and measure how many of these they
identify. Another example of an activity within the e-mail attack scenario is to present
participants with two e-mail messages from a bank, asking them to identify the one that is
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a hoax and the one that is real, while asking them to identify all the indicators that
triggered the suspicion of the hoax e-mail. As such, this study was set to develop a tool to
assess the observable hands-on, scenarios-based cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals. Figure 4 illustrates the four step development process of the CSI. Whereas,
additional information about the process of using the developed tool to collect and score
the performances on the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals is provided in
succeeding sections.

Figure 4. CSI development process

Expert Panel
Content validity is established with literature reviews, pre-testing, and expert
panels (Straub, 1989). An expert possesses skills, (i.e., knowledge, experiences, &
abilities) in a particular field or domain (Lichvar, 2011). Furthermore, an expert panel can
attest to how well “the measure includes an adequate and representative set of items that
tap the concept” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, p. 226). When judgmental information is
essential, prior research has employed the Delphi technique (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004;
Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Using the Delphi technique provides a method for consensusbuilding without direct confrontation among the experts (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).
Characterized as an iterative group communication process, the Delphi technique allows
for experts to address complex problems in an effective manner (Okoli & Pawlowski,
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2004; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Scheele, 1975). Prior research, e.g., Brancheau and
Wetherbe (1987), as well as Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule (2001), utilized the
Delphi technique for forecasting, issue identification, and concept/framework
development. In addition, the Delphi technique ensures both reliability and validity as it
exposes the study to a panel of differing, and often contradictory, opinions while seeking
convergence through SMEs’ feedback (McFadzean, Ezingeard, & Birchall, 2011;
Schmidt et al., 2001). Thus, this study followed the Delphi technique for the purpose of
identifying the indispensable expert opinion of cybersecurity threats and related skills
(Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
Key features that are regarded as the Delphi technique include anonymity,
iteration, controlled feedback, and statistically clustering the responses (Rowe & Wright,
1999; Skinner, Nelson, Chin, & Land, 2015). Anonymity was maintained in this study
with the use of Web-based questionnaires. Between each iteration, feedback was
controlled by incorporating the SMEs’ responses into the next iteration of the Delphi
technique data collection. Therefore, once this study identified the top platform
independent threats and related cybersecurity skills for mitigating those threats,
scenarios-based, hands-on tasks were developed for establishing the CSI. Prior to data
collection, the tasks utilized to measure each respective skill of the CSI were presented to
a panel of eight experts in the cybersecurity field for review and validation. These experts
were recruited from industry and government agencies specializing in cybersecurity. The
expert recruitment email may be seen in Appendix C. All suggested changes received
from the panel’s review were addressed and incorporated into the iPad app. The tasks
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were then presented to the panel as an iteration of the Delphi technique. Appendix D
provides the expert qualitative and quantitative questionnaire.
Scenario Method
A hypothetical scenario method is “also known as a vignette or policy capturing
method” (Siponen & Vance, 2010, p. 492). With this method, each participant is
presented with “written descriptions of realistic situations and then requested responses
on a number of rating scales” (Trevino, 1992, p. 127-128). According to Hu et al. (2011),
individuals are naturally unwilling to report their actual criminal or deviant behavior. But,
participants view scenarios as unintimidating and nonintrusive (D’Arcy et al., 2009).
Therefore, business, criminology, IS, and medical scholars have resorted to the use of
scenarios to elicit input from participants (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Hu et al., 2011;
Kushniruk, Triola, Borycki, Stein, & Kannry, 2005). A scenario method was the most
used methodology in 55% of the 174 ethical decision-making articles reviewed by
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005). Certification or specialist exams utilize a scenario-based
and/or hands-on tasks to test the candidate’s skills (Furnell, 2004). Moreover, scenariobased assessments are utilized throughout industry and the military to measure skills
(Thomas & Lee, 2015; Wesolek, 2009). Antisocial and ethical/unethical behavior
assessment is commonly assessed with scenario-based methods (Siponen & Vance,
2010). A scenario method was utilized to simulate two real cases of compromised critical
information systems in part of measuring the participant’s abuse intent (Kim, Park, &
Baskerville, 2016). Therefore, consistent with prior IS research (i.e., D’Arcy et al., 2009;
Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012), the designed scenarios
presented in this study represent realistic and commonplace situations to the participants.
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Hands-on Tasks and Skill Assessments
Hands-on skill assessments are a substantial part of the medical academic
community (Berendonk et al., 2013). Skill assessments are completed through the
observation of demonstrated hands-on tasks (Vassiliou et al., 2014). Scenario-based,
hands-on tasks are used to measure a driver’s skills without causing harm to individuals,
damage to vehicles, or inaccurate self-perceived responses (Sahami & Sayed, 2013;
Sundström, 2011). Moreover, aviation academic curriculum utilizes scenario-based,
hands-on assessments to measure pilots’ skills as mandated by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) (Thomas & Lee, 2015). The importance of skills and hands-on
skills assessment found in the aviation, healthcare, and transportation industries appear
applicable to cybersecurity skills as well. Torkzadeh and Lee (2003) used self-reported
surveys to research the individual’s perception of his or her skills and cautioned that
perceived skills do not always correspond to actual skills. In the work of Gravill et al.
(2006), users inaccurately assessed their knowledge of a specific software package. Prior
literature addressed the flaws and consequences of erroneous self-assessment reporting
(Mann, 2010; Weigel & Hazen, 2014; Xu & Yeh, 2012). Thus, this study established a
validated set of observable hands-on, scenarios-based tasks that measure cybersecurity
skills of non-IT professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment.
MyCyberSkills™ iPad App Development
The CSI includes a set of hands-on tasks that measure the actual cybersecurity
skills level of non-IT professionals. With the use of literature, (i.e., Mathews & Yadron,
2015; Yadron et al., 2014), a scenario starts each task. Each skill included a group of four
cybersecurity related hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify and
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demonstrate their skill level as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance
et al., 2012). The MyCyberSkills™ prototype operationalized the previously developed
and validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index into an iPad app that was
used to assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. The conceptual design of
the CSI as it is presented within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app is exhibited in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Conceptual design of the CSI operationalized within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad
App Prototype

Each of the cybersecurity related tasks were presented individually in the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Once task one of a skill was completed, scenario two was
presented. Task two then incremented in difficulty and presents the non-IT professional
again with four response options. As the non-IT professional responds to each hands-on
observable task, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app recorded the non-IT professional’s
performance level using a scale of 0 to 10 and then presented the next cybersecurity
related task. According to Schwartz and Fischer (2004), an individual cannot solve a
problem that exceeds the individual’s highest developed skill level. Therefore, the level
of difficulty increased as each task was presented within the respective skill. This
presentation continued measuring the non-IT professionals’ skills with an easy,
somewhat difficult, difficult, and very difficult task within each skill. Figure 6 illustrates
the process of each skill (n) as it was presented to the non-IT professional. Each skill
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began with a scenario (e.g., n.1) and then presented the hands-on task with four response
options (e.g., n.1.1). For some skills, the individual’s response warranted an alternate
scenario for maintaining the incremental level of difficulty. When this occurs, scenarios
were identified as A and B as seen in the somewhat difficult category of Figure 6.
Once the set of tasks for a specific skill was completed by the non-IT
professional, the next set of tasks began with a relevant scenario followed with the easiest
cybersecurity related task and incrementing to the very difficult cybersecurity related
task. This process continued until a response was received for each task. A total weighted
score interval of zero to 40 was possible for each cybersecurity skill. During an iteration
of a Delphi technique, the SMEs were asked to assign each cybersecurity skill (CSi) a
weight,𝑊𝑊𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 , ranging from zero to one. A coefficient was identified after the set number

of cybersecurity skills were established in order to display the overall CSI score range of
zero to 100. After completing all tasks, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app displayed the
achieved overall CSI score interval of zero to 100 and the score interval of zero to 100 for
each individual cybersecurity skill.
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Figure 6. Scenario-based, hands-on task skill levels

Reliability and Validity
Reliability may exist without validity, but validity cannot exist without reliability
(Mendoza, 2014; Reinard, 2006). Moreover, validity and reliability influence the amount
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a researcher may learn about the phenomenon under investigation (Leedy & Ormrod,
2013). Within this development research, the use of the sequential-exploratory method
allowed for the capitalization of the benefits from each qualitative and quantitative
research approach to collect data (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Terrell, 2011).
Reliability ensures consistent or error-free results are produced (Rogers, 1995), as well as
makes “a statement about measurement accuracy” (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001, p.
5). Thus, this study evaluated the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app in an iterative development
process, in addition to analyzing the data captured (Onwuegbuzie, Bustamante, &
Nelson, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007).
Reliability
The CSI was developed to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT
professionals incorporated into the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. An index’s reliability is
determined by reproducibility and consistency (Helminen, Halonen, Rankinen, Nissinen,
& Rauramaa, 1995). Without stability and internal consistency, the measurement
precision of an index is viewed as weak (Helminen et al., 1995; Chakhssi, de Rulter, &
Bernstein, 2010). Therefore, the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app assessment was validated
with rigorous testing. As the scenarios-based, hands-on tasks were developed, each
response received a score. To ensure the correct score was recorded and the participant
received an accurate CSI score by the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, 21 non-IT
professionals were observed while demonstrating their hands-on tasks during the pilottest of the initial app. As the participants demonstrated each task, the action taken was
manually recorded and scored. The overall CSI score and individual skills scores were
then manually calculated. If the manual calculations compared to those calculated by the
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MyCyberSkills™ iPad app matched, reliability and validity was established. Thus, the
individual task scores, the overall score for each skill, and the CSI score was validated
using this manual process. Moreover, to ensure a higher reliability of this study, a balance
was found among factors (i.e., data collection environment, length of the test) which were
identified to effect reliability and validity (Reinard, 2006).
Validity
An index is considered valid based on its relevance and provision of an accurate
assessment of what it is measuring (Alias, 2015). Incorporating the validation of a
measure can help substantiate research findings, as well as “move the IS field forward
toward meaningful replicated studies” (Straub, 1989, p. 162). Striving for validation, a
panel of 8 experts were asked how relevant each task was in accessing the respective skill
and to describe in their own words revisions (if any) needed to the skill or task (Boudreau
et al., 2001; Nelson, Bustamante, Wilson, & Onwuegbuzie, 2008). Moreover, asking for
IS and cybersecurity experts’ comments and suggestions ensured the MyCyberSkills™
iPad app maintained consistency, ‘state-of-the-art’ knowledge, and industry practicality
(Ball et al., 2015; Wang, Nieveen, & van den Akker, 2007). Therefore, this study reduced
the threat to validity by using scenarios-based, hands-on tasks that were validated through
an expert panel following the Delphi technique (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). Furthermore,
eliciting the feedback from the SMEs ensured both validity and reliability that the criteria
used to develop the CSI measure was appropriate (Brown, Levy, Ramim, & Parrish,
2015).
Pilot-Test Initial App
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Once the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app was developed, it was subjected to a pilottest (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003). As part of the pilot-test of the
initial app, 21 non-IT professionals were observed while demonstrating their skills with
the presented hands-on, cybersecurity tasks. Appendix E provides the pilot study
recruitment email. Prior to beginning the pilot test, all participants were asked to
acknowledge and sign an informed consent form as seen in Appendix F. The main focus
of this pilot-test was on instrument (i.e., indices, scales) fidelity (Collins, Onwuegbuzie,
& Sutton, 2006; Vogt & Johnson, 2011). Regardless of research paradigm, instrument
fidelity is defined as the goal in every study “to obtain data that has one or more of the
following characteristics: trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, objectivity,
confirmability, and/or transferability” (Collins et al., 2006, p. 77). Moreover, this pilottest ensured the appropriateness of each item (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). Furthermore, it
assessed 1) the extent to which the scenarios and tasks of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app
appeared relevant and interesting to the respondent; 2) the specific tasks measured the
intended content area; and 3) the tasks sampled the respective skill (Onwuegbuzie et al.,
2010). At this phase, outcome validity and generalizability were important in order to
assess the consequences of using the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app and the extent the
meaning of scores may be generalized to other populations (Collins et al., 2006;
Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).
Rigorous testing and an expert-panel as discussed at length in earlier sections
were fundamental in establishing fidelity of the CSI benchmarking index and the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Furthermore, open-ended questions were available for
participants to provide feedback on the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. Sequentially
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collecting qualitative and quantitative data allowed for the identification of themes in the
SMEs’ validated skills, which were integrated into the design and development of the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app (Creswell et al., 2003). Moreover, collecting both qualitative
and quantitative data at this phase not only enhanced the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, but
also validated the CSI (Nelson et al., 2008; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). Thus, the
feedback and results from this pilot-test were analyzed and all adjustments to the CSI
and/or MyCyberSkills™ iPad app were completed. At the conclusion of the pilot test,
each participant was given the opportunity to attend a cybersecurity workshop offered by
the researcher as a token of appreciation for their time.
Design and Empirical Study: Revised App
Problematic items identified during the initial pilot-test were revised or discarded
(Onwuegbuzie et al, 2010; Sheng et al., 2007). After the initial app was revised, an
empirical study was conducted using the previously developed and validated iPad app.
This quantitative phase of the developmental research study collected data from 188 nonIT professionals and documented the results of the measure. Furthermore,
recommendations for the administration as a result from the data analysis are presented in
Chapter Five. Additional information regarding the sample, data collection, and analysis
follows.

Population and Sample
This study evaluated the cybersecurity skills level of 188 non-IT professionals
using the developed CSI. These non-IT professionals were recruited at multiple public
places located within the Southeastern United States. Appendix G was utilized to recruit
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participants for the empirical research study. With the assistance of demographic data, the
sample characteristics in the research were used to test the representation of the data
collected to the generalized study population (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013). Although
inferential statistics were not performed on categorical data, (i.e., age, gender) collecting
the data assists in identifying the characteristics of the participants (Terrell, 2012).
Therefore, demographic data, such as age, gender, as well as job function, were collected
as part of this research study.
Data Collection
Prior to beginning the empirical research study, participants were asked to
complete an informed consent form as seen in Appendix H. With the use of the validated
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, 188 non-IT professionals were presented a set of
cybersecurity skills related tasks. Each task contained four possible responses. As the
participants responded to each task, the score associated with that response was recorded
on a spreadsheet stored as a password protected Google document. After all participants
completed the MyCyberSkills™ app, a cybersecurity workshop was provided to assist the
participants in furthering their cybersecurity knowledge, experience, and abilities.
Pre-analysis data screening involved the process of detecting and dealing with
irregularities or problems with the collected data (Levy, 2006). It may also indicate that
the developed tool is not performing as expected. According to Mertler and Vannatta
(2010), data must be checked for accuracy and consistency. Furthermore, rigorous data
examination must be completed prior to final analysis of data as missing data may create
substantial effects (Alias, 2015; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Thus, missing
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data were evaluated during and prior to the final analysis of data to ensure a consistent,
valid, and reliable tool (Levy, 2006; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).
Data Analysis
Findings of the data collected from the literature review, the expert panel, and the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app initial pilot-test was used to develop a valid and reliable
assessment of cybersecurity skills levels. Furthermore, an empirical study using the
validated MyCyberSkills™ iPad app was conducted with a group of 21 non-IT
professionals. The iterative processes lead to increased instrument fidelity as well as
reliability and validity (Alias, 2015; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). By using literature and
an expert panel, the identification of the most common cybersecurity organizational
threats addressed RQ1. This study addressed RQ2 by using the literature review and
expert panel for establishing the four tasks for each of the skills needed to thwart the most
common cybersecurity organizational threats. This research study addressed RQ3 by
validating the CSI benchmarking index with the expert panel and pilot-test. Testing the
level of cybersecurity skills of 188 non-IT professionals using the same CSI developed in
RQ3 addressed RQ4. To assess the fifth research question, descriptive and one-way
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on age, educational level, gender, job
function, primary online activity, number of hours accessing the Internet, and experience
using technology to identify any significant differences to CSI scores.

Resources
In order to complete this study the following resources were used:
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•

Access to a pool of non-IT professionals in the U.S.: The sample was
collected from a population of non-IT professionals recruited from
multiple public places located in the Southeastern United States. This
sample was accessible and approved through the IRB process.

•

App developers: App developers were required to assist with
programming the MyCyberSkills™ tool. These developers were recruited
from a population of students at two institutions of higher education
located in the state of Florida. The developers assisted in programming the
MyCyberSkills™ prototype used in collecting data for this research study.

•

Articulate Storyline 2: This software package was used by the app
developers to transform the written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks into a
Web-based prototype. The prototype was published using HTML5, Flash,
and JavaScript.

•

Expert panel: Many phases of this research relied on an expert panel of
industry, academic, and government professionals in the cybersecurity
field. Feedback from the expert panel was used to identify the top nine
cybersecurity skills as well as the validity of the scenarios, tasks, and
scores presented in the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app.

•

Google forms: This web-based tool was used to develop the expert survey
instrument as well as record the data collected upon the participant
completing the iPad app. An account was activated for use and the survey
was designed to ensure successful implementation of the tool.
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•

Statistical analysis tool: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS)
was used to complete descriptive statistics, frequency distributions, and
ANOVA. Lists and graphs were created using the SPSS tool to compile
and analyze the results.

•

Technology: Each step of the dissertation process required the use of
hardware, software, networking, and library resources. Communications
with advisor and committee, researching the literature, and writing the
dissertation report was completed using this technology. All necessary
technology components were acquired.

Summary
Chapter Three included a description of the research design, methodology, an
explanation of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app, and measures that were used in this
research study. This study was classified as developmental in nature and used a
sequential-exploratory approach to validate the reliability of the CSI benchmarking index
and MyCyberSkills™ iPad app. A discussion of methods was presented that answered
the five research questions. The cybersecurity skills benchmarking index was developed
using a literature review, in addition to feedback by an expert panel. The assessment
criteria was based on literature and initiated the process. Next, SMEs evaluated the
cybersecurity threats, related skills, and their respective weights used in the CSI.
Feedback from the SMEs were then used to revise the CSI until a consensus was reached
using the Delphi technique. According to McFadzean et al. (2011) as well as Skinner et
al. (2015), this methodology is acceptable to assess the reliability and validity of the CSI.
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Issues pertaining to reliability and validity of the CSI and MyCyberSkills™ iPad app
were discussed along with how they were mitigated.
Next, the population and sample for this research study was presented, which
included the selection criteria of the non-IT professionals. Furthermore, the pre-analysis
data screening, as well as the data analysis addressed the research questions. Pre-analysis
data screening was used to “detect irregularities or problems with the collected data”
(Levy, 2006, p. 150). It assisted in identifying when the developed tool was not
performing as intended. Chapter Three concludes with the resources that were used to
conduct this research study.
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Chapter 4
Results

Overview
Outlined within this chapter are the results of the data analysis for this research
investigation. The results for this study were completed in three phases. Details of each
phase are presented in the order conducted. Phase One details the data collection for the
expert panel using the Delphi technique, which was then used to develop a novel
scenarios-based, hands-on cybersecurity skills benchmarking index. The results of Phase
One address RQ1 and RQ2.
Phase Two details the development of a the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype
using gathered expert panel feedback with the Delphi technique as well as a pilot study to
ensure the prototype accurately recorded scores. The results of Phase Two address RQ3.
The conclusion of the chapter includes Phase Three, the results summary using the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype, and the data analysis processes used. The results of
Phase Three address RQ4 and RQ5.

Qualitative Research and Expert Panel (Phase One)
This study employed the Delphi technique for the purpose of identifying the
expert opinion of cybersecurity threats and related skills (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). The
Delphi technique is an iterative group communication process that allows for experts to
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address complex problems in an effective manner and without direct confrontation
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
Anonymity was maintained in this phase of this research study with the use of Web-based
questionnaires (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Between each questionnaire, the SMEs’
responses were incorporated into the next questionnaire to control the feedback.
The first round of the Delphi technique consisted of 12 platform independent
cybersecurity threats. After a survey of the existing body of knowledge, these threats
were identified and presented to SMEs from the Florida chapter of the InfraGard, a
public-private partnership between the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)’s cyber division and private sector that focus on cybersecurity, along with SMEs
from other federal agencies such as the United States Secret Services’ (USSS) Electronic
Crimes Task Force team and industry. The SMEs were asked to rank in order of
importance the threats that non-IT professionals poses for organizational cybersecurity
posture. Based on the SMEs’ feedback, the list of 12 platform independent cybersecurity
threats were narrowed to 10 platform independent cybersecurity threats. In the second
Delphi technique round, the 10 cybersecurity threats identified as the most significant
were then presented to the panel of SMEs in a Web-based survey using a seven-point
Likert scale. Based on a score of ‘1’ for strongly disagree and ‘7’ for strongly agree, each
of the cybersecurity threats were evaluated to determine 1) if it was valid to be included
in the core fundamental cybersecurity threat set, 2) if a proposed platform independent
skill is valid or not; and 3) if each proposed skill is independent from other proposed
cybersecurity skills. Moreover, the SME panel were asked to provide a ranking of ‘1’,
representing the highest threat, to ‘10’, representing a lessor threat. The skill importance

89

weight for each skill was calculated so the lessor threat received a weight closer to 0.0,
while the highest ranked threat received a weight closer to 1.0. The threats are based on
their skill importance weight in causing harm to organizations and individuals, while
forming the foundations for the development of the hierarchical-based indexing to
measure an overall measure of cybersecurity skills. The survey instruments were
designed electronically using Google forms.
A consensus of SMEs’ opinion emerged with the top nine cybersecurity skills
needed for non-IT professionals. Malware, PII, and WIS related threats were the distinct
categories identified among the cybersecurity threats and identified matching skills. At
the end of the second Delphi round, the difference between the lowest ranked
cybersecurity threat/skill and the highest was nearly 2.28. Cybersecurity threat and
corresponding skill number 10, preventing unauthorized information system access via
workstation lock or log out, was identified as an outlier and the SMEs highly
recommended discarding it. Table 16 displays the collective results of both Delphi rounds
identifying the top nine platform independent cybersecurity skills, their respective
category, SME rankings, number of SME responses, ranked weighted total, ranked
average, and skill importance weight. These results were used to address the first and
second research questions of this study. Moreover, the top nine platform independent
cybersecurity skills, their respective category, SME rankings, and skill importance weight
was the foundation for the start of Phase Two.
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Table 16
Rankings of the Top Nine Cybersecurity Skills

Qualitative and Quantitative Research (Phase Two)
The development and validation of a comprehensive set of scenarios-based,
hands-on benchmarking index was a good step in the right direction. At the beginning of
Phase Two and using the results of Phase One as a foundation, the designed set of
observable scenarios-based, hands-on tasks that measure cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals without the bias of or need for self-assessment were operationalized into a
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Each skill was designed in this study to include a
group of four cybersecurity related hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify
and demonstrate their skill level as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012;
Vance et al., 2012). The sum of all nine skills multiplied times their respective weight
(wi) was then multiplied times the coefficient of 2.5. This resulted in the non-IT
professionals’ CSI score of zero to 100. With the use of literature, (e.g., Glazer and
Yadron 2014), a scenario began each task. The written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks
were transformed into a digital presentation with the use of Articulate Storyline 2. Table
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17 displays the CSI, the SMEs ranked cybersecurity skills (SKi), their respective handson tasks (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ), description, range, and weight. These results were incorporated into the
design and development of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype.
Table 17
Cybersecurity Skills Index and SMEs Ranked Cybersecurity Skills

After transforming each of the skills into a digital presentation, a panel of eight
SMEs was presented a questionnaire in a portable document format (PDF) soliciting
qualitative and quantitative feedback on the scenarios, tasks, and scoring of the prototype.
Table 18 lists the collective feedback from all experts and the adjustments made to the
initial MyCyberSkills™ prototype. Recommendations of the SMEs’ were incorporated
into the prototype before the second round of the Delphi technique began. The expert
panel was asked to repeat the review process again on the revised MyCyberSkills™ iPad
app prototype at which time the interpretation of the original feedback and adjustments
was validated. At the conclusion of round two of the Delphi technique, a consensus of
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SMEs’ opinion was reached regarding the digital presentation of the scenarios, tasks, and
scoring within the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Thus, no additional iterations
with the expert panel were required. The Delphi technique reinforced the validity of the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype.
Table 18
Delphi Expert Panel Suggested Adjustments to Initial Prototype
Change #
1.

Feedback
The “I don’t know” button
for aborting a task was
confusing and values scored
too high.

Adjustments
All “I don’t know” options were changed to
a different action or “no change” option and
values assigned according to possible threat
mitigation.

2.

Scenario associated with
question 2.2a and 2.2b does
not address preventing
malware via non-secure
Websites.

The scenario was changed to request a
driver update to simulate a malware
infection threat.

3.

Question 6.2 needs to ask for
credit card information not
MoneyPak.

Image for question 6.2 revised to ask for
credit card information.

4.

Question 7.1 should have an
option to “do nothing” or
“leave in parking garage”.

“I don’t know” option was changed to
“leave USB on the ground”.

Furthermore, throughout the development process rigorous testing was completed
to ensure the validity and reliability of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. To
ensure the correct score was recorded by the prototype, the business administrator sent a
participation email to the non-IT professionals on staff at a public place of worship in the
Southeastern United States for completing the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Out
of the 40 invitations to participate, 21 non-IT professionals were observed while
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demonstrating their hands-on tasks during the pilot-test, generating a 52.5% response
rate. When comparing the manually recorded scores to the automatically recorded scores,
a scoring anomaly was noted early in the pilot-test. The anomaly was corrected prior to
the conclusion of Phase Two. Any revisions to the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype
were made prior to the empirical study (Sheng et al., 2007; Terrell, 2012). Thus, the third
research question and goal of this study was addressed with the novel CSI
operationalized with the MyCyberSkills™ prototype. Furthermore, to address the fourth
and fifth research questions and goals in Phase Three, the validated and reliable
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype was the tool used for collecting data from non-IT
professionals and documenting the results of the measure.

Quantitative Research (Phase Three)
Pre-Analysis Data Screening
In Phase Three, participants were recruited by 1) a participation flyer posted
throughout a public place of worship located in the Southeastern United States as well as
2) flyers and emails shared with multiple public places of business (i.e., restaurants,
medical offices, etc.). Participants were invited to attend a cybersecurity workshop or
receive a $5 Starbucks gift card as a token of appreciation for completing the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Out of 975 individuals invited, 245 responses were
collected, generating a 25.1% response rate.
Prior to completing the MyCyberSkills™ prototype, participants were asked
demographic and technology usage questions. These responses were recorded prior to the
participant beginning the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. Elimination of cases with
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response-set, verification of missing data, and addressing extreme cases or outliers was
performed in the pre-analysis data screening to ensure the accuracy of the data collected
(Levy, 2006). Pre-analysis data screening revealed 57 participants that began the study,
but did not complete the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype tool.
Data accuracy was not a matter of concern as the prototype was designed to allow
only a single valid answer for each task. Additionally, completed responses were
downloaded into a Google form and imported into Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS) for further pre-analysis data screening. The data set was analyzed for
any response-set issues, where participants selected the same scale value for all the
technology usage questions. After a visual inspection, no response-set cases appeared.
Respondents were forced to select from a fixed set of answers and were unable to leave
any items unanswered. However, to ensure the accuracy of the data, descriptive statistics
were used to identify the minimum and maximum value for each skill score to determine
if responses were within the expected value range and were not accidently corrupted
during the transfer of data between Google forms and SPSS. All responses were within
the expected ranges and none were removed. Thus, generating 188 or 19.3% non-IT
professional responses for analysis.
The means and standard deviations for the individual skills one to nine, skill
categories, and overall CSI for the population were calculated. A review of the calculated
means of the individual skills, skill categories, and overall CSI was used to address the
fourth research question and goal of this study. Table 19 presents the means and standard
deviations for the population. With a mean of 81.4%, the participants appeared most
skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential information (SK1). Moreover, the
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participants appeared least skilled in the preventing malware via Email (SK5) with a
mean of 47.4%. Figure 7 presents a visualization of the means of the individual skills
(e.g., SK1, SK2, SK3, SK4, SK5, SK6, SK7, SK8, & SK9) and the malware, PII, and WIS
categories sorted from highest to lowest along with the overall CSI for the population.
Table 19
Means and Standard Deviations for the Population (N=188)

Individual Skills
Categories

Item
SK1 Leak Confidential Info
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK4 PII Theft via email
SK5 Malware via email
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK7 USB Exploits
SK8 Password Exploits
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network

Mean
0.814
0.493
0.484
0.598
0.474
0.581
0.652
0.725
0.636

Standard
Deviation
0.142
0.190
0.298
0.198
0.185
0.159
0.191
0.175
0.215

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)
Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

0.730
0.516

0.119
0.116

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)
Overall CSI

0.573
0.605

0.161
0.099

Figure 7. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI
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Demographic Analysis
After completing the pre-analysis data screening, 188 responses remained for
analysis, with demographics that represents a likeness to that of the general sample
targeted. Of which, 107 or 56.9% were females and 81 or 43.1% were completed by
males. An analysis of the participants’ ages revealed that 122 or 64.9% were 20 to 54
years of age. Overall, 151 or 80.3% had a primary activity of work related tasks, social
network (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.), or search engine (Google, Yahoo, Bing,
etc.) and 124 or 66.0% accessed the Internet 6 to 30 hours per week. While nearly 35% of
the participants were in administrative staff, managerial, or executive job functions, over
50% of participants responded with the job function of ‘other’. Given a community
approach was used to recruit participants, a response of ‘other’ could include occupations
such as nurses, teachers, dental assistants, cashiers, and wait staff. Moreover, an analysis
of the participants’ education revealed 120 or 63.8% had completed a college or graduate
degree, 56 or 29.8% had earned a high school diploma, as well as 12 or 6.4% responded
with ‘other’ education. After further review, a participants’ response of ‘other’ education
indicated an industry certification or license obtained outside of the secondary or higher
education institutions (i.e., nursing or teaching certification, etc.). Moreover, 159 or
84.6% of the participants indicated having neutral to absolutely expert level of experience
using technology. Appendix I displays the details of the demographics of the population.
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Table 20
Descriptive Statistics of the Population (N=188)
Item
Gender
Male
Female

Frequency

Percentage (%)

81
107

43.1%
56.9%

Age
18 or 19 years
20 to 24 years
25 to 34 years
35 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
55 to 64 years
65 or older

11
21
41
27
33
36
19

5.8%
11.2%
21.8%
14.4%
17.5%
19.2%
10.1%

Academic Level
High school diploma
College degree
Graduate degree
Other

56
90
30
12

29.8%
47.9%
15.9%
6.4%

Job Function
Administrative staff
Managerial
Executive
Operations
Physical security
Information Technology
Technical Services
Other

38
18
8
9
2
10
5
98

20.2%
9.6%
4.3%
4.8%
1.0%
5.3%
2.7%
52.1%

Accessing the Internet
0 to 5 hours
6 to 10 hours
11 to 15 hours
16 to 20 hours
21 to 25 hours
26 to 30 hours
31 or more hours

10
42
19
19
23
21
54

5.3%
22.4%
10.1%
10.1%
12.2%
11.2%
28.7%
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Table 20
Descriptive Statistics of the Population (N=188) (Cont.)
Item
Primary Internet Activity
Work related tasks
Social network (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.)
Search engine (Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc.)
Personal finances (banking, bill paying, etc.)
Entertainment (music, movies, video games, etc.)
Shopping or auctions (eBay, Amazon, etc.)
Personal communication (email, voice over IP, etc.)
Experience with Technology
Absolutely no experience
Somewhat no experience
Slightly no experience
Neutral experience
Slightly expert experience
Somewhat expert experience
Absolutely expert experience

Frequency

Percentage (%)

76
31
44
5
10
17
5

40.4%
16.5%
23.4%
2.7%
5.3%
9.0%
2.7%

2
9
18
46
67
34
12

1.1%
4.8%
9.6%
24.4%
35.6%
18.1%
6.4%

Two types of analyses were conducted to assess for any difference between the
two recruitment locations: frequencies and percentages as well as a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). The population was divided into two groups. This research study
compared the two groups: Group A and Group B. Group A included individuals from a
public place of worship within the Southeastern United States. Group B included
individuals from multiple public places of business (i.e., restaurants, medical offices,
etc.). Group A included 108 or 57.4% individuals of a public place of worship. Group B
included 80 or 42.6% individuals from public places of business. Details of the
demographics of the population of each group are presented in Table 21.
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Table 21
Descriptive Statistics for Each Group in the Population

Item

Group A
Group B
(N=108)
(N=80)
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
(%)
(%)

Gender
Male
Female

48
60

44.4%
55.6%

33
47

41.2%
58.8%

Age
18 or 19 years
20 to 24 years
25 to 34 years
35 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
55 to 64 years
65 or older

3
9
20
12
19
29
16

2.8%
8.3%
18.5%
11.1%
17.6%
26.9%
14.8%

8
12
21
15
14
7
3

10.0%
15.0%
26.3%
18.8%
17.5%
8.7%
3.7%

Academic Level
High school diploma
College degree
Graduate degree
Other

34
49
17
8

31.5%
45.4%
15.7%
7.4%

22
41
13
4

27.5%
51.2%
16.3%
5.0%

Job Function
Administrative staff
Managerial
Executive
Operations
Physical security
Information Technology
Technical Services
Other

23
11
4
2
1
5
5
57

21.3%
10.2%
3.7%
1.9%
0.9%
4.6%
4.6%
52.8%

15
7
4
7
1
5
0
41

18.8%
8.7%
5.0%
8.7%
1.3%
6.3%
0.0%
51.2%

Accessing the Internet
0 to 5 hours
6 to 10 hours
11 to 15 hours
16 to 20 hours
21 to 25 hours
26 to 30 hours
31 or more hours

6
29
13
12
13
7
28

5.6%
26.9%
12.0%
11.1%
12.0%
6.5%
25.9%

4
13
6
7
10
14
26

5.0%
16.3%
7.5%
8.7%
12.5%
17.5%
32.5%
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Table 21
Descriptive Statistics for Each Group in the Population (Cont.)
Group A
Group B
(N=108)
(N=80)
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
(%)
(%)

Item
Primary Internet Activity
Work related tasks
Social network (Facebook,
Twitter, etc.)
Search engine (Google, Yahoo,
Bing, etc.)
Personal finances (banking, bill
paying, etc.)
Entertainment (music, movies,
video games, etc.)
Shopping or auctions (eBay,
Amazon, etc.)
Personal communication (email,
voice over IP, etc.)
Experience with Technology
Absolutely no experience
Somewhat no experience
Slightly no experience
Neutral experience
Slightly expert experience
Somewhat expert experience
Absolutely expert experience

41

38.0%

35

43.8%

28

25.9%

16

20.0%

18

16.7%

13

16.3%

7

6.5%

3

3.7%

7

6.5%

10

12.5%

5

4.6%

0

0.0%

2

1.8%

3

3.7%

2
6
13
29
33
16
9

1.8%
5.6%
12.0%
26.9%
30.6%
14.8%
8.3%

0
3
5
17
34
18
3

0. %
3.7%
6.3%
21.3%
42.5%
22.5%
3.7%

In addition, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the statistical significant
mean differences for each individual skill, skill categories, and overall CSI between those
completing the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype at a public place of worship and
those that completed the prototype at a public place of business. The groups were
analyzed by using descriptive statistics to calculate the means and standard deviations.
Table 22 provides the means and standard deviations for each group.
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With a mean of 80.6%, Group A (members of a public place of worship)
participants appeared most skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential
information (SK1). Moreover, the participants appeared least skilled in the preventing
malware via email (SK5) with a mean of 46.3%. When comparing the means of the three
categories, the mean of the malware category was the lowest at 51.5%. The mean of the
PII category was 57.3% and the WIS category appeared with the highest mean of 73.2%.
Thus, presenting a mean difference of 21.7% between the malware and WIS categories.
Furthermore, the overall CSI mean was 60.4%. Figure 8 presents a visualization of the
means of the individual skills and the skill categories sorted from highest to lowest along
with the overall CSI for Group A.
Table 22
Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group of the Population

Individual Skills
Categories

Item
SK1 Leak Confidential Info
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK4 PII Theft via email

Group A (N=108)
Standard
Mean Deviation
0.806
0.132
0.491
0.193
0.467
0.292
0.600
0.192

Group B (N=80)
Standard
Mean Deviation
0.823
0.154
0.495
0.187
0.506
0.307
0.596
0.209

SK5 Malware via email
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK7 USB Exploits
SK8 Password Exploits
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network

0.463
0.592
0.685
0.703
0.652

0.188
0.152
0.180
0.174
0.217

0.487
0.565
0.606
0.754
0.615

0.181
0.169
0.198
0.174
0.213

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

0.732

0.110

0.728

0.131

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

0.515

0.114

0.516

0.120

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

0.573

0.152

0.572

0.173

Overall CSI

0.604

0.091

0.605

0.111
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Figure 8. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI for Group A
(Members of Public Place of Worship) (N=108)

Group B (members of public places of business) participants also appeared most
skilled in the preventing the leaking of confidential information (SK1) with a mean of
82.3%. Moreover, the participants appeared least skilled in the preventing malware via
email (SK5) with a mean of 48.8%. When comparing the means of the three categories,
the mean of the malware category was the lowest at 51.6%. The mean of the PII category
was 57.3% and the WIS category appeared with the highest mean of 72.8%. Thus,
presenting a mean difference of 21.2% between the malware and WIS categories.
Furthermore, the overall CSI mean was 60.5%. Figure 9 presents a visualization of the
means of the individual skills and the skill categories sorted from highest to lowest along
with the overall CSI for Group B.
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Figure 9. Means of the Individual Skills, Skill Categories, and Overall CSI for Group B
(Members of Public Places of Businesses) (N=80)

Using SPSS to calculate the ANOVAs for each individual skill, skill category,
and overall CSI by recruitment location, a significance difference, F(1, 186) = 8.038, p =
0.005, was demonstrated on SK7: Preventing information system compromise via USB or
storage drive/device exploitations between Group A and Group B participants. Although
no significant difference, F(1, 186) = 3.867, p = 0.050, was demonstrated on SK8:
Preventing unauthorized information system access via password exploitations,
additional research involving this skill is needed. Skills one, two, three, four, five, six,
and nine had no significant difference between groups with each a p > 0.25. No
significant differences were demonstrated on the malware, F(1, 186) = 0.000, p = 0.987,
PII, F(1, 186) = 0.000, p = 0.989, and WIS, F(1, 186) = 0.046, p = 0.830. Furthermore,
no significant difference, F(1, 186) = 0.005, p = 0.942, was demonstrated on overall CSI
between each recruitment location. Table 23 provides an overview of the mean square
scores and ANOVA results.
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Table 23
ANOVA Results for Each Recruitment Location (N=188)
ANOVA

Individual Skills
Categories

Item
SK1 Leak Confidential Info
SK2 Malware via Non-Secure Web
SK3 PII Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK4 PII Theft via email
SK5 Malware via email
SK6 Credit Card Theft via Non-Secure Web
SK7 USB Exploits
SK8 Password Exploits
SK9 PII Theft via Social Network

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Mean
Square
between
Groups
0.012
0.000
0.070
0.000
0.026
0.032
0.285
0.118
0.061

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

1

0.000

0.046

0.830

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

1

0.000

0.000

0.987

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

1

0.000

0.000

0.989

1

0.000

0.005

0.942

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

F
0.635
0.014
0.786
0.014
0.778
1.281
8.038
3.867
1.312

Sig.
0.426
0.906
0.376
0.903
0.378
0.259
0.005
0.050
0.253

**

Reviewing the individual skills, skill categories, and overall CSI, this study
determines that preventing information system compromise via USB or storage
drive/device exploitations (SK7) has the most significant difference by recruitment
location compared to the other skills. However, when SK7 was combined with SK1 and
SK8 to form the WIS category, there was no significant difference between recruitment
locations. Furthermore, the overall CSI has no significant difference between groups.
Data Analysis
After the pre-analysis data screening was performed, the descriptive analysis for
the population (N=188) was conducted. To answer RQ5, the useful responses were
analyzed using descriptive statistics to calculate the skill categories (e.g., malware, PII, &
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WIS) as well as overall CSI means and standard deviations by age, gender, educational
level, job function, primary activity, hours accessing the Internet, and experience using
technology. It was noted the minimum CSI score was 28.5%, maximum score was
85.5%, and the overall CSI mean was 60.5%. A review of the means for the malware, PII,
and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by age group revealed that higher means were
achieved by those in the 45 to 54 years of age group. Furthermore, those 25 to 34 years of
age had the second highest means in PII, WIS and overall CSI. Figure 10 presents the
means and standard deviations of the malware and PII skills categories for each age
group. Whereas, Figure 11 presents the means and standard deviations of the WIS skill
category and overall CSI for each age group. Next ANOVAs were conducted to assess if
there were differences between the skill categories of malware, PII, and WIS, as well as
overall CSI by age groups. Results of the ANOVA by the WIS category were significant,
F(6, 181) = 2.218, p = 0.043, suggesting there were differences in age groups by WIS.
The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.422,
p = 0.208. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 0.972, p = 0.445. The
ANOVA conducted for overall CSI was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.478, p =
0.187, suggesting there were no differences in overall CSI by age group. Table 24
presents the ANOVA results of the three categories as well as overall CSI by age group.

106

Figure 10. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by Age
Group (N=188)

Figure 11. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by
Age Group (N=188)

Table 24
ANOVA Results for Age Group (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

F

Sig.

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

6

0.019

1.422

0.208

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

6

0.025

0.972

0.445

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

6

0.030

2.218

0.043

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

6

0.014

1.478

0.187

*
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The means of malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI were lower
for females than males. Figure 12 presents the means and standard deviations of the
malware, PII, and WIS skills categories as well as overall CSI by gender. One-way
ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the skill categories
and overall CSI by gender. Results of the ANOVA for the WIS category was significant,
F(1, 186) = 5.872, p = 0.016, suggesting there were differences in WIS by gender. The
ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not significant, F(1, 186) = 0.224, p =
0.636. Results were similar for the PII category, F(1, 186) = 1.442, p = 0.231. The
ANOVA conducted for overall CSI was also not significant, F(1, 186) = 3.158, p =
0.077, suggesting there were no differences in overall CSI by gender. Table 25 presents
the ANOVA results for the malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by
gender.

Figure 12. Means and Standard Deviations of Skill Categories and Overall CSI by
Gender (N=188)

108

Table 25
ANOVA Results for Gender (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

1

0.003

0.224

0.636

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

1

0.037

1.442

0.231

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

1

0.081

5.872

0.016

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

1

0.031

3.158

0.077

F

Sig.

*

A review of the calculated means for administrative staff revealed malware, PII,
WIS and overall CSI percentages attained were higher than those in managerial job
functions. Figure 13 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware and PII
skills categories by job function. Furthermore, Figure 14 presents the means and standard
deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by job function. One-way
ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the skill categories
and overall CSI by job function. Results of the ANOVA for the overall CSI was not
significant, F(7, 180) = 1.690, p = 0.113, suggesting there were no significant difference
in overall CSI by job function. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was
also not significant, F(7, 180) = 1.262, p = 0.271. Results were similar for the PII
category, F(7, 180) = 1.683, p = 0.115. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not
significant, F(7, 180) = 1.128, p = 0.347, suggesting there were no differences in WIS by
job function. Table 26 presents the ANOVA results of the malware, PII, WIS, and overall
CSI by job function.
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Figure 13. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by Job
Function (N=188)

Figure 14. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by
Job Function (N=188)
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Table 26
ANOVA Results for Job Function (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

7

0.017

1.262

0.271

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

7

0.042

1.683

0.115

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

7

0.016

1.128

0.347

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

7

0.016

1.690

0.113

F

Sig.

The PII and WIS skills categories as well as the overall CSI means of those
accessing the Internet six to 10 hours weekly were nearly 4.5% to 12.2% higher than
those accessing the Internet any other times. Moreover, those participants accessing the
Internet 11 to 15 hours weekly scored nearly 7.0% higher than the other groups. Figure
15 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware and PII skills categories by
the number of hours participants accessed the Internet. Furthermore, Figure 16 presents
the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by the
number of hours the participants accessed the Internet. One-way ANOVAs were
conducted to assess if there were differences between the malware, PII, WIS categories
and overall CSI by the number of hours participants accessed the Internet. Results of the
ANOVA for the overall CSI was not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.663, p = 0.132, suggesting
there were no significant difference in overall CSI by the number of hours accessing the
Internet. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was also not significant, F(6,
181) = 1.099, p = 0.364. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 1.939, p =
0.076. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.648, p =
0.691, suggesting there were no differences in WIS by the number of hours a participant
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accessed the Internet. Table 27 presents the ANOVA results of the skill categories as well
as overall CSI by the number of hours participants accessed the Internet.

Figure 15. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by
Hours Online (N=188)

Figure 16. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by
Hours Online (N=188)
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Table 27
ANOVA Results for Hours Accessing the Internet (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

6

0.014

1.099

0.364

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

6

0.049

1.939

0.076

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

6

0.009

0.648

0.691

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

6

0.016

1.663

0.132

F

Sig.

Review of the means for the malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall
CSI by primary activity revealed approximately 8.0% between the highest and lowest for
each category. The means for overall CSI by primary activity varied from highest to
lowest nearly 2.5 percentage points. Figure 17 presents the means and standard deviations
of the malware and PII skills categories by primary activity. Whereas, Figure 18 presents
the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and overall CSI by primary
activity. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between
the malware, PII, WIS skills categories, and overall CSI by primary activity. Results of
the ANOVA for the overall CSI was not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.304, p = 0.934,
suggesting there were no significant difference in overall CSI by primary activity. The
ANOVA conducted for the malware category was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.969,
p = 0.447. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6, 181) = 0.537, p = 0.779. The
ANOVA conducted for WIS was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 0.678, p = 0.667,
suggesting there were no significant differences in WIS by primary activity. Table 28
presents the ANOVA results of the malware, PII, WIS, and overall CSI by primary
activity.
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Figure 17. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by
Primary Activity (N=188)

Figure 18. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by
Primary Activity (N=188)
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Table 28
ANOVA Results for Primary Activity (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

6

0.013

0.969

0.447

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

6

0.014

0.537

0.779

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

6

0.009

0.678

0.667

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

6

0.003

0.304

0.934

F

Sig.

A review of the means for the malware and WIS categories as well as overall CSI
incremented with education. Furthermore, those with ‘other’ education had the highest
means for malware, WIS, and overall CSI. The PII category means revealed those with
college educations had higher percentages than the remaining educational groups. Figure
19 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware, PII, and WIS skills
categories as well as and overall CSI by education. To assess if there were differences
between the malware, PII, and WIS skills categories as well as the overall CSI by
primary activity, ANOVAs were conducted. Results of the ANOVA revealed the overall
CSI by education was significant, F(3, 184) = 2.670, p = 0.048, suggesting there were
significant differences in overall CSI by education. The ANOVA conducted for the
malware category was not significant, F(3, 184) = 2.461, p = 0.064. Results were similar
for the PII category, F(3, 184) = 0.937, p = 0.423. The ANOVA conducted for WIS was
also not significant, F(3, 184) = 2.000, p = 0.115, suggesting there were no significant
differences in WIS by education. Table 29 presents the ANOVA results of the malware,
PII, WIS, and overall CSI by education.

115

Figure 19. Means and Standard Deviations of the Skill Categories and Overall CSI by
Education (N=188)

Table 29
ANOVA Results for Education (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

3

0.032

2.461

0.064

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

3

0.024

0.937

0.423

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

3

0.028

2.000

0.115

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

3

0.025

2.670

0.048

F

Sig.

*

The means for the skill categories and overall CSI incremented as the level of
experience identified by the participants increased. Moreover, the means of the malware
and PII skills categories as well as the overall CSI revealed those reporting slightly no
experience using technology had higher means than those reporting neutral experience
using technology. Figure 20 presents the means and standard deviations of the malware
and PII skills categories by the participants’ experience using technology. Whereas,
Figure 21 presents the means and standard deviations of the WIS skills category and
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overall CSI. ANOVAs were conducted to assess if there were differences between the
malware, PII, and WIS categories as well as overall CSI by the participants’ experience
using technology. Results of the ANOVA for the overall CSI was significant, F(6, 181) =
2.361, p = 0.032, suggesting there was a significant difference in overall CSI by the
participants’ experience using technology. Results were similar for the PII category, F(6,
181) = 2.387, p = 0.030. The ANOVA conducted for the malware category was not
significant, F(6, 181) = 0.625, p = 0.709. Furthermore, the ANOVA conducted for WIS
was also not significant, F(6, 181) = 1.746, p = 0.112, suggesting there were no
significant differences in WIS between groups. Table 30 presents the ANOVA results of
the malware, PII, WIS, and overall CSI by the participants’ experience using technology.

Figure 20. Means and Standard Deviations of Malware and PII Skills Categories by
Experience Using Technology (N=188)
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Figure 21. Means and Standard Deviations of WIS Skills Category and Overall CSI by
Experience Using Technology (N=188)

Table 30
ANOVA Results for Experience Using Technology (N=188)
ANOVA
Item

df

Mean Square
between Groups

Malware (SK2, SK5, & SK6)

6

0.008

0.625

0.709

PII (SK3, SK4, & SK9)

6

0.059

2.387

0.030

WIS (SK1, SK7, & SK8)

6

0.024

1.746

0.112

Overall CSI
* - p<.05, ** - p<.01, *** - p<.001

6

0.022

2.361

0.032

F

Sig.

*

*

As indicated from the results above, the fifth research question and goal of this
study was to empirically assess if there are significant differences on CSI based on age,
education level, gender, job function, and experience using technology. As seen in the
results, job function, the number of hours accessing the Internet, and primary activity
completed while accessing the Internet were found to have no significant differences.
Only a few items showed a significant difference on CSI. These included experience
using technology for PII, gender and age group for WIS, as well as educational level and
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experience using technology for overall CSI. Overall, a large majority showed no
significant differences on the skill categories and overall CSI.

Summary
In this chapter, the results of the study were presented. First, the chapter began
with Phase One of the research study, which involved qualitative research conducted
through a literature review in order to develop a new survey instrument for eliciting input
from the expert panel. The results of both surveys using the Delphi technique were
discussed. Furthermore, the discussion included the elicitation of the expert panel to
confirm the platform independent cybersecurity threats and related skills, along with the
weight allocations that were used to calculate the CSI. Next, Phase Two of the study was
discussed, which involved the qualitative and quantitative research conducted to
operationalize the novel CSI into the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. The
discussion encompassed the engagement of the expert panel to validate the prototype
using the Delphi technique and the pilot-test completed to ensure the validity and
reliability of the developed prototype. The chapter concluded with Phase Three that
presented the data analysis and results of the MyCyberSkills™ prototype.
The five goals of this study were attained using a three-phased approach: the first
specific goal of this research study was to identify a set of cybersecurity skills pinpointed
by SMEs as those that can help mitigate critical vulnerabilities. The second specific goal
of this research study was to develop a set of tasks that could be categorized and linked to
the SMEs identified set of cybersecurity skills. The third specific goal of this research
study was to develop a benchmarking index to hierarchically aggregate the set of SMEs
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identified cybersecurity skills using observable hands-on tasks. The first three goals were
met with the development of the MyCyberSkills™ prototype, which operationalized the
single benchmarking Cybersecurity Skills Index ranging from zero to 100. The fourth
specific goal of this research study was to assess the scores of the CSI benchmarking
index for the aggregated set of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188
non-IT professionals. This goal was met as presented in Table 19 and Table 22.
The last and fifth goal was to measure if there were any significant differences to
CSI based on age, gender, educational level, job function, or experience using
technology. To begin the analysis, a pre-analysis of the data for screening data purpose
was performed. The screening data resulted in the elimination of 57 responses resulting in
188 usable cases. A demographic analysis was made to examine more information about
the population of this study. Details of the demographics of the populations are presented
in Table 20.
This study performed one-way ANOVAs to analyze if there were any significant
differences to CSI based on age, gender, educational level, job function, or experience
with technology. Experience using technology for PII, gender and age group for WIS, as
well as educational level and experience using technology for overall CSI had significant
differences with a p<0.05. The results of the ANOVA as presented in Table 24, Table 25,
Table 26, Table 29, and Table 30 met the last and fifth goal of this research study.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
Because cyber-attacks have intensified over time, organizations are increasing the
priority of cybersecurity skills due to substantial financial and information losses caused
by insiders (APWG, 2016; PwC, 2016). Thus, the main goal of this research study was to
design, develop, and empirically test a set of hands-on tasks set to measure the
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. This study built on prior research that
defined cybersecurity skills as (i.e., preventing malware, PII theft, & WIS breaches) the
combination of an individual’s technical knowledge, ability, and experience surrounding
the hardware and software required to execute IS security to mitigate cyber-attacks
(Axelrod, 2006; Boyatzis & Kolb, 1991; Choi et al., 2015). This research study achieved
the five goals with a three-phased approach. First, an expert panel using the Delphi expert
methodology was used to design and validate the scenarios-based, hands-on
benchmarking index for measuring cybersecurity skills (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014).
Second, the previously developed and validated scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking
index was operationalized into an iPad app prototype that was used to assess the
cybersecurity skill of non-IT professionals. Last, the previously developed and validated
iPad app prototype was used to empirically assess the hands-on cybersecurity skills of
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non-IT professionals based on demonstrated skills on cybersecurity tasks and document
the results of the measure.

Discussion
The first result of this study was the development of a validated and reliable app
set to measure the observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Furthermore,
the second result of this study indicated there was a significant difference in the
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals based on educational level and
experience using technology. Moreover, there was a significant difference in WIS
breaches based on gender and age group. In addition, there was a significant difference in
PII theft based on experience using technology. No significant difference was found in
CSI, malware, PII theft, or WIS breaches based on a non-IT professional’s job function,
number of hours accessing the Internet, or primary activity completed while accessing the
Internet.
Overall, not one participant demonstrated 100% skilled in all of the cybersecurity
tasks. This suggests a need for cybersecurity skilled non-IT professionals and the
MyCyberSkills™ tool to help mitigate the opportunities for organizational information
vulnerabilities and breaches. Third, the results indicated that higher levels of education
increased a non-IT professional’s demonstrated cybersecurity skills. Fourth, as
experience using technology increased, the non-IT professionals demonstrated improved
skills on cybersecurity tasks. Fifth, the results of those in administrative staff positions
demonstrated higher cybersecurity skills than those in managerial job functions. Last,
those 18 to 24 as well as 65 and older demonstrated less cybersecurity skills than those
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ages 20 to 64. This insinuates non-IT professionals entering or exiting the workforce may
be at a higher risk of falling for a cyber-attack.
Limitations were noted with this study. The first limitation of this study is the
generalizability of the specific index values (not the weights) due to the sample used. It is
expected that the SMEs composed hierarchical weights will be generalized in the future,
but over time, the use of the CSI on different organizations may gather different values.
Next, the collected data were limited to several organizations within the Southeastern
United States. While the sample size of 188 non-IT professionals is valid, further studies
conducted can recruit participants from a wider community approach to increase
validation of the results and generalizability. Furthermore, the scenarios-based, hands-on
skills measured are another limitation. As new cyber threats arise, other scenarios-based,
hands-on tasks can be developed and incorporated into the CSI for revising the
MyCyberSkills™ prototype used in this study. Finally, the quantity of time needed to
complete the MyCyberSkills™ prototype was another limitation.

Implications
The outcomes of this study contributed notably to the body of knowledge, and has
several implications for providing researchers and practitioners insight into the
cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals. Understanding an employee’s
cybersecurity skills levels is critical to securing information and the systems that stores it
as organizations continue to rely on the Internet for conducting their daily operations.
This research study validated that the CSI benchmarking index could be used to assess
the hands-on cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals based on their demonstrated
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skills on cybersecurity tasks. Furthermore, this research study provides the
MyCyberSkills™ tool that can be used to assess the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT
professionals within an organization. This tool could assist organizations with assessing
cybersecurity skills levels to provide insight into what the organization can do to further
mitigate threats due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by non-IT professionals.

Recommendations and Future Research
This study was a developmental research and outlined the research approach to
design and validate the scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking cybersecurity skills
index that was used to measure the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals.
Moreover, the inclusion of the sequential-exploratory research method within the
development contributed to the goodness of data collected and validity of the results
(Terrell, 2011; Wisdom & Creswell, 2013). The threats, relative skills, and weights of the
hierarchical measure for observable cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals were
developed using the Delphi technique. Followed by the development of the
MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype, which was used for collecting and analyzing data
using the research plan discussed here. The findings and results of the statistical analyses
were reported.
There are many areas for future research that were identified based on the results
of this developmental research. First, future studies are warranted to increase the validity
of the MyCyberSkills™ tool. In addition, more research is needed to take place in and
outside the Southeastern United States while expanding the sample size to increase the
generalizability. The second recommendation includes selection of a population with
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criteria specifically for supervisors and subordinates to determine if the CSI level of a
supervisor affects the CSI of a subordinate. A third recommendation for future research
study could be set to determine the effects of organizational culture on the CSI level of
the employees. Whereas, a fourth recommendation for future research study includes
investigating the effects of behaviors (i.e., curiosity, boredom, etc.) or emotions (i.e.,
depression, sadness, etc.) on the CSI level of an individual. The fifth recommendation is
to investigate the relationship, if any, between self-reported cybersecurity skills levels
and actual demonstrated cybersecurity skills measured using the MyCyberSkills™ tool.
Finally, the study could be replicated with the scenarios-based, hands-on tasks adapted
into a video presentation using an audience response system.

Summary
This dissertation study addressed the research problem of threats to organizational
IS due to vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Hovav & Gray, 2014; Jensen
et al., 2014; Peha, 2013). Conducting transactions, interacting, and sharing information
on the Internet are a part of everyday life. But, completing activities online does not come
without its risks as well as potential for harm. Organizations, individuals, and
governments continue to regularly report substantial information and financial losses due
to vulnerabilities as well as breaches caused by insiders. But, when it comes to protection
of corporate IS, human errors and social engineering appear to prevail in circumventing
such IT protections. This research study facilitated an increase in the body of knowledge
regarding non-IT professionals as it relates to their cybersecurity skills in the context of
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malware, PII, and WIS related threats. Moreover, it addressed a valid problem with
practical significance (Terrell, 2015).
The main goal of this research was to design, develop, and empirically test a set
of hands-on tasks set to measure the cybersecurity skills level of non-IT professionals.
Building on the work of Berendonk et al. (2013), Choi (2013), Morcke et al., (2013),
Weigel and Hazen (2014), as well as Vance et al. (2014), this work was classified as a
developmental research. Thus, it answered the call to develop a hierarchical measure of
cybersecurity skills levels of non-IT professionals that addressed the problem of
vulnerabilities and breaches caused by employees (Ellis & Levy, 2009; Ramim &
Lichvar, 2014). Furthermore, this study sought to determine if there are any significant
differences to cybersecurity skills levels based on gender, age, level of education, job
function, primary online activity, hours accessing the Internet, and experience using
technology. Therefore, a three-phased approach was used to meet the goals of this study
and answer five research questions.
In Phase One, a panel of subject matter experts from the Florida chapter of the
InfraGard, a public-private partnership between the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)’s cyber division and private sector that focus on cybersecurity along
with SMEs from other federal agencies such as the United States Secret Services’ (USSS)
Electronic Crimes Task Force team and industry were engaged to answer the first three
research questions as follows.
RQ1: What are the specific subject matter experts (SMEs) identified set of
cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals, which address the most
common organizational cybersecurity threats?
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RQ2: What are the specific SMEs identified tasks that can be categorized, linked,
and validated to the set of the identified cybersecurity skills?
RQ3: What are the specific SMEs identified weights of the tasks and skills that
enable a validated hierarchical aggregation to the Cybersecurity Skills
Index (CSI) benchmarking index?
The Delphi technique was employed for the purpose of identifying indispensable expert
opinion. After an extensive literature review, Web-based questionnaires were developed
for the SMEs to indicate their agreement with the non-platform independent threats, their
matching skills, and their recommendation for their ranking (weight) allocation. The
outcome of the two survey rounds was the development of and the relative weight
allocations for the top nine non-platform independent cybersecurity, along with their
respective category.
Phase Two expanded on the developed and validated comprehensive set of
scenarios-based, hands-on benchmarking index from Phase One. Each skill was designed
to include a group of four tasks for the purpose of identifying demonstrated skills levels
as if in a real-life situation (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012; Vance et al., 2012). Articulate
Storyline 2 was then used to transform the written scenarios-based, hands-on tasks into a
digital presentation. The CSI, SMEs ranked cybersecurity skills, their respective handson tasks, description, range, and weight as presented in Table 17 were incorporated into
the design and development of the MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype. A panel of
SMEs were then engaged to solicit qualitative and quantitative feedback on the scenarios,
tasks, and scoring of the prototype. After two rounds of the Delphi technique, pilot
testing was conducted to ensure the scores were recorded accurately by the prototype.
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After minor revisions, the validated and reliable MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype
was the tool used for collecting data from 188 non-IT professionals in the third phase of
this study.
The third phase of this research study achieved answers to the remaining research
questions. First, the highest score of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of the group was 85.5%. The minimum CSI score
attained was 28.5% with a mean CSI score of 60.5%. Second, there were significant
differences to CSI for level of education and experience using technology. Furthermore,
significant differences with a p<0.05 were identified for WIS based on gender and age
group, as well as PII based on experience using technology. Third, there were no
significant differences for the malware category. Finally, no significant differences to the
CSI were identified for job function, the number of hours accessing the Internet, and
primary online activity. The results suggest that level of education and experience using
technology may make a difference on the level of vulnerabilities and breaches caused by
an employee. Whereas, the type of work duties performed, the number of hours nor the
activity completed online do not appear to make any difference on a non-IT
professional’s cybersecurity skills level.
RQ4: What are the scores of the CSI benchmarking index for the aggregated set
of SMEs identified cybersecurity skills of a group of 188 non-IT
professionals?
RQ5: Are there any significant differences to CSI based on age, gender,
educational level, job function, primary online activity, number of hours
accessing the Internet, or experience using technology?
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As with any research study, this study had three main limitations. First, the set of
skills combined to form the CSI is a limitation. Second, generalization of the results from
this research study were cautioned as the reliability and validation of the CSI and
MyCyberSkills™ tool relied on an expert panel. The expert panel, the relative weights,
criteria, and measures may not be representative of the broader population. Further
studies are required with other populations to increase generalizability of the results and
improve the validity of the instrument. Last, the results represent data at a point in time is
a limitation.
This research study made several contributions to the information security domain
and body of knowledge. The study provided empirical evidence regarding the magnitude
of cybersecurity skills to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities and breaches caused by
insiders. This evidence is important to academia and practitioners to assist with
understanding the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Given the heightened
concerns of organizations regarding cybersecurity, the results of this research study
provided organizations with empirical evidence of how to measure the cybersecurity
skills of their employees. Unidentified inadequate cybersecurity skills of non-IT
professionals could result in substantial financial and information losses for an individual,
organization, or government.
In conclusion, other researchers can use the CSI benchmarking index to assess
cybersecurity skills for new populations. The MyCyberSkills™ iPad app prototype can
be used as a tool by researchers and organizations to assess and provide awareness
regarding cybersecurity skills. In addition, SETA programs may include the
MyCyberSkills™ tool to assess and aide in the mitigation of cyber threats.
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Appendix B
Institutional Review Board Approval Letter
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Appendix C
Expert Recruitment Email
Dear Information Systems and Cybersecurity Experts,
I need your help in providing expert feedback on a measurement for my upcoming
doctoral research study. I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems and
Cybersecurity at the College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern
University (NSU), working under the supervision of Professor Yair Levy, and a member
of his Levy CyLab. My research is seeking to develop an index to measure cybersecurity
skills levels of non-Information Technology (IT) professionals.
Using a prior set of experts, nine platform independent cybersecurity skills needed by
non-IT professionals were identified. The set of nine cybersecurity skills are established
as the foundation for this phase of the research. In this part of the research, I need your
assistance in validating the proposed scenarios, tasks, and scores assigned for each task.
Here are the nine skills previously identified and validated in the first stage of my
dissertation research:
1. Preventing the leaking of confidential digital information to unauthorized
individuals
2. Preventing malware via non-secure Websites
3. Preventing personally identifiable information (PII) theft via access to non-secure
networks
4. Preventing PII theft via e-mail phishing
5. Preventing malware via e-mail
6. Preventing credit card information theft by purchasing from non-secured
Websites
7. Preventing information system compromise via USB or storage drive/device
exploitations
8. Preventing unauthorized information system access via password exploitations
9. Preventing PII theft via social networks
The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated form. No
personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a participant, you agree to
keep all information regarding this research confidential and to refrain from disclosing
any details related to this survey or the material contained within it. Please be advised
that this research is under process with the NSU’s Cybersecurity Incubator, and as such,
full confidentiality is required.
If you are willing to participate in this phase of the research, maintain a high level of
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confidentiality, and non-disclosure as it pertains to the scenarios, tasks, and
scorings, please reply to this email by April 7, 2016. As a token of appreciation for
providing your scholarly and professional contribution to the field of cybersecurity,
you will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card upon completing the questionnaire. After
receiving your reply, a follow up email with the survey in the form of a fillable PDF
file attached will be sent to you within 24 hours. If you prefer the PDF file be sent to
an alternate email address, please provide it with your reply. If you wish to decline,
please reply indicating that.
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and
contribution to this research study. Should you wish to receive the findings of the study,
please indicate it with your reply to this email and I will be happy to provide you with
information about the academic research publication(s) resulting from this study.
Warmest Regards,
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate
E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu
Information Systems and Cybersecurity

133

Appendix D
Expert Qualitative and Quantitative Questionnaire
IRB protocol #: 2016-16
Principal investigator(s)
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate of
Information Systems and Cybersecurity
P.O. Box 7596
Panama City Beach, FL 32413
Phone: (850) 890-7310
Email: mc2418@nova.edu

Co-investigator(s)
Yair Levy, Ph.D.
Information Systems and Cybersecurity
College of Engineering & Computing
The DeSantis Building - Room 4058
3301 College Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
Phone: (954) 262-2006
Email: levyy@nova.edu

For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact:
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)
Nova Southeastern University
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790
Dear [Expert],
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this phase of my doctoral dissertation research
study, titled, “Development of the Cybersecurity Skills Index (CSI): A Scenarios-Based,
Hands-On Tasks Measure of Non-IT Professionals’ Cybersecurity Skills”, maintain a
high level of confidentiality, and non-disclosure.
The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated form. No
personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. As a token of appreciation for
providing your scholarly and professional contribution to the field of cybersecurity, you
will receive a $10 Starbucks gift card. There are no costs to you for participating in this
study. Risks to you are minimal, meaning they are not thought to be greater than other
risks you experience every day. The activities in this study may have unknown or
unforeseeable risks. Please feel free to contact Mrs. Carlton or Dr. Yair Levy should you
have any questions or research-related injury. You may also contact the IRB at the
numbers indicated above with questions as to your research rights.
As a participant, you agree to keep all information regarding this research confidential
and to refrain from disclosing any details related to this questionnaire or the material
contained within it with non-NSU individuals and/or parties. You are asked to delete any
material related to this study from your computer after returning the completed the
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questionnaire.
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide
to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of
services you have a right to receive. If you choose to withdraw, you are asked to delete
any material related to this study from your computer and to contact Mrs. Carlton or Dr.
Yair Levy of your decision.
The nine skills previously identified and validated are presented within the attached
fillable PDF file. Each skill includes a group of four cybersecurity related scenariosbased, hands-on tasks for the non-IT professional to identify and demonstrate their skill
level as if in a real-life situation. Questions are presented until you have evaluated all
nine skills. If you agree with the scenario, task, or scoring presented, you only need to
select ‘yes’ for the respective question. If you do not agree with any scenario, task, or
scoring presented, select ‘no’ for that question and complete the respective comment field
with your recommendation.
As a cybersecurity expert, you are asked to
• review the scenario and respond if you believe the scenario is valid in the
context of the related skill;
• review the task associated with its respective scenario to determine if it
measures the related skill;
• evaluate the scoring associated with each of the four options (answers)
presented for the related task; and
• evaluate the increment of difficulty for that set of scenarios and tasks.
At the conclusion of the questionnaire, select the ‘email form’ button in order to email the
form to Professor Yair Levy as a PDF attachment.
Thank you again for your time and assistance.
Warmest Regards,
Melissa Carlton, Ph.D. Candidate
E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu
Information Systems and Cybersecurity
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Appendix E
Pilot Study Recruitment Email
Dear Fellow First Baptist Church Members,
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Systems and Cybersecurity at the College of
Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University, working under the
supervision of Professor Yair Levy, and a member of his Levy CyLab. My research is
seeking to develop an application (app) to measure cybersecurity skills levels of nonInformation Technology (IT) professionals. Non-IT professionals are any person that
performs work-related duties using a computer connected to the Internet that is not
located in a formal IT or Technical Services department. Non-IT professionals include,
but are not limited to, teachers, office assistants, managers, or executives. It excludes IT
or Technical Services professionals.
I need your assistance to ensure the application is working accurately. The application is
named MyCyberSkills™ and it will help organizations as well as industry entities to
assess the cybersecurity skills of non-IT professionals. Your assistance is being solicited
to complete tasks of nine cybersecurity skills previously identified.
A lab manager will manually record your score based on the responses you select within
the application for comparison of the electronic scoring system, so I can ensure the
scoring recorded are accurate. The study is expected to take no more than an hour of your
time. The information provided will be used for this research study and in aggregated
form. No personal identifiable information (PII) will be collected. Following the
experiment, and as a token of appreciation for your time, I will provide a workshop on
cybersecurity issues and how to protect yourself, your family, and your workplace from
cyber-attacks. You are welcome to attend this important workshop free of charge right
after the experiment, or contact me for additional information about future workshops,
which you are welcome to attend free of charge.
If you are willing to participate, please reply to this email and a lab manager will contact
you to schedule an appointment.
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and
contribution to this phase of my research study.
Should you wish to receive the findings of the study, please send me an email and I will
be happy to provide you with information about the academic research publication(s)
resulting from this study.
Warmest Regards,
Melissa Carlton, PhD Candidate
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E-mail: mc2418@nova.edu
Information Systems and Cybersecurity
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Appendix F
Pilot Study Informed Consent Form
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Appendix G
Research Study Recruitment Flyer
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Appendix H
Research Study Informed Consent Form
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